
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

WFP World Food Programme

Hunger Hotspots

FAO–WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity

December 2026 to May 2027 outlook



Global Network Against Food Crises
INTEGRATED ACTIONS FOR LASTING SOLUTIONS

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
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Map of early warning hunger hotspots:
December 2026 to May 2027

MORE INFORMATION



Hotspots of highest concern
Hotspots of very high concern
Hotspots

Key drivers and aggravating factors

- Conflict/insecurity
- Economic shocks
- Flooding
- Dry conditions
- Cyclone
- Disease/epidemic
- Displacement

Source of data: FAO and WFP. 2026. *Hunger Hotspots analysis (December 2026 to May 2027)*. Rome.
Source of map: United Nations Geospatial. 2026. Map of the World. In: *United Nations*. [Cited 1 October 2026]. https://www.un.org/geospatial/content/map-world-1.
Refer to the disclaimer on page ii for the names and boundaries used in this map. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

Notes: White icons on coloured background indicate main drivers; smaller icons coloured according to hunger hotspot category indicate marginal drivers. The displacement icon is used when displacement is a key driver of acute food insecurity, or when it is a significant factor contributing to vulnerability, even if not a direct driver. It applies to internally displaced persons as well as migrants and refugees.

* The shaded area indicates the approximate extent of the Central American Dry Corridor covered in this report for which recent acute food insecurity data are available. As a climate-defined region spanning multiple countries, its boundaries are not fixed and may vary depending on the criteria used.

Abbreviations

AMN	acute malnutrition
CARI	Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security
CH	Cadre Harmonisé
CILSS	Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel
DFA	de facto authorities
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
GIEWS	Global Information and Early Warning System
GNAFC	Global Network Against Food Crises
GoY	Government of Yemen
HNRP	Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan
IDP	internally displaced person
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
UN	United Nations
USD	United States dollar
WFP	World Food Programme



© FAO/Adam Ibrahim

Executive summary

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) warn that acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate significantly in 16 hunger hotspots between December 2026 and May 2027, compared with a similar timeframe one year earlier. These findings prompt an early warning for urgent humanitarian action.

The **Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, northern Nigeria and Yemen** are at the highest level of concern. In the Sudan, ongoing conflict continues to drive displacement and disrupt livelihoods, markets and agricultural activities amid extreme access constraints and drought conditions. Acute food insecurity is expected to remain extreme, particularly across Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan. In South Sudan, intensifying violence, increasingly constrained humanitarian access and rising displacement, compounded by climatic shocks and macroeconomic challenges, threaten to exacerbate already extreme levels of acute food insecurity. In Somalia, localized conflict and political tensions are compounding the impact of previous droughts, high food prices and flood risks. In northern Nigeria, armed violence continues to drive displacement, disrupt livelihoods and sustain elevated food prices. In Yemen, escalating conflict and displacement are adding to a protracted crisis – already characterized by widespread critical levels of acute food insecurity, the adverse economic impact of the regional crisis, climatic shocks, humanitarian funding shortfalls and extreme access constraints.

The risk of Famine remains plausible in the Sudan and South Sudan. In the Sudan, a risk of Famine is projected through January 2027 in 13 areas of North Darfur and South Kordofan. In South Sudan, the latest analysis available in 2026 identified a risk of Famine across four counties of Upper Nile and Jonglei states.

Afghanistan and Haiti remain hotspots of very high concern, notably because of worsening economic conditions, in addition to border tensions in Afghanistan and the impact of climatic shocks and persistent gang violence in **Haiti. The Democratic Republic of the Congo also remains at this level** due to continuing conflict and displacement, compounded by an Ebola outbreak that poses additional risks to livelihoods and food security**. Palestine has been reclassified from a hotspot of highest concern to a hotspot of very high concern**, reflecting improvements in acute food insecurity following the October 2025 ceasefire – although needs remain severe and gains fragile.

Chad, Uganda, the Southern Africa region – Eswatini, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe – **and the Central American Dry Corridor have been added to the list of hunger hotspots.**

Madagascar, Mali and Myanmar remain hotspots. Lebanon is no longer classified as a hotspot.

Conflict, economic pressures and climatic risks are driving the outlook

Armed conflict and violence remain among the primary drivers of acute food insecurity across 12 of the 16 hotspots, causing displacement, restricting humanitarian access and disrupting livelihoods, agricultural production and markets. **Economic pressures** are compounding country-specific shocks. Elevated food, energy, fertilizer and transport costs are weakening household purchasing power and increasing production and import costs, while constrained fiscal space limits the capacity of governments to cushion vulnerable populations. Disruptions affecting major shipping routes and energy and fertilizer markets risk sustaining these pressures during the outlook period.

El Niño represents an additional major risk during the outlook period and beyond. Drought and elevated temperatures threaten the 2026/27 main agricultural season across parts of Southern Africa. In the Central American Dry Corridor, further rainfall deficits could compound losses from the 2026 *Primera* season and prolong households' dependence on markets. In Eastern Africa, wetter conditions may support crops, pasture and water availability in some areas affected by dry conditions but also heighten the risk of damaging floods.

These impacts can emerge before harvests through reduced planting, agricultural employment and incomes. Production losses can subsequently deplete household food stocks, increase market dependence and constrain recovery where livelihoods and coping capacities are already weakened. Timely anticipatory action can help prevent acute food insecurity from deepening by protecting livelihoods, food consumption and agricultural production – strengthening resilience and reducing subsequent losses and response costs.

These risks are unfolding **as humanitarian assistance becomes increasingly constrained.** Conflict-related access restrictions and declining humanitarian funding are limiting the scale and coverage of assistance in several of the most severe crises, including assistance to populations facing the highest levels of acute food insecurity. Funding gaps are also weakening assessment, monitoring and analytical capacity, at a time when robust evidence is essential for prioritizing scarce resources and supporting timely operational decisions.

The historical record reveals how persistent these crises have become

The five countries identified as hunger hotspots of highest concern in this edition (Somalia, Yemen, South Sudan, the Sudan and Nigeria) have been repeatedly identified as part of this list since 2022. In these contexts, large-scale humanitarian assistance helped avert some of the worst outcomes but did not eliminate the risk of catastrophic food insecurity, which persisted or subsequently re-emerged.

While conflict, economic shocks, climate extremes and access constraints have remained the primary drivers of these crises, declining humanitarian resources have reduced the capacity to sustain gains and mitigate worsening conditions. Sustained humanitarian assistance remains critical, but humanitarian action alone cannot break the cycle of recurrent crises observed in these contexts. Progress will also depend on renewed political commitment, intensified diplomatic efforts to prevent and resolve conflict, improved humanitarian access and longer-term investments that strengthen resilience and livelihoods.

Preventing famine must remain central to these efforts. Urgent, targeted humanitarian action is needed to save lives and livelihoods across all identified hotspots, especially those of highest concern, to prevent starvation and further loss of life. Greater investment in anticipatory action is also needed where hazards are forecast but have not yet materialized, including in areas exposed to El Niño-related drought and flood risks.

Early interventions can save lives, protect assets and livelihoods and reduce the scale and cost of later emergency responses. The report informs these efforts by providing country-specific recommendations for emergency response alongside anticipatory measures – where appropriate – and preparedness actions designed to meet urgent needs while preventing further deterioration.


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Introduction

The Hunger Hotspots report is a forward-looking publication that identifies areas where acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate significantly over the next six months. In this report, covering December 2026 to May 2027, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) identify 16 hunger hotspots, including two multi-country hotspots (Southern Africa and the Central American Dry Corridor).

These are marked by very high levels of acute food insecurity, with conditions expected to deteriorate significantly during the outlook period compared with a similar timeframe one year earlier.

Compared with the previous edition, published in June 2026, **Chad, Uganda, the Southern Africa region** (Eswatini, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe) **and the Central American Dry Corridor** have been added to the list of hotspots. **Chad** has been included due to ongoing risks linked to the conflict in the Sudan, including rising refugee arrivals and displacement pressures, alongside localized insecurity, higher agricultural production costs, limited access to fertilizers and adverse cropping conditions in parts of central and eastern areas. **Uganda** has been included due to the expected significant deterioration in acute food insecurity, driven by drought-related crop losses associated with El Niño and rising food prices, while above-average rainfall forecasts

Figure 1. Categories of hunger hotspots and situations requiring monitoring

Hotspots of highest concern

This category includes hotspots facing Famine or a risk of Famine, and populations already in Catastrophe (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC]/Cadre Harmonisé [CH] Phase 5). It also covers hotspots at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions, where people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) are facing worsening conditions, exacerbated by severe humanitarian access constraints that could lead to an escalation in acute food insecurity and the occurrence of catastrophic conditions during the outlook period.

Hotspots of very high concern

These are hotspots where sizeable populations – more than 500 000 people or over 10 percent of the population analysed (with at least 50 percent of the population analysed) – are estimated or projected to be facing Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity, or are identified as severely food insecure as per the WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) methodology; and where the number of people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or severe food insecurity (based on WFP's CARI methodology) is expected to increase during the outlook period, based on the latest data available, and contextual drivers are likely to further deteriorate.

Hotspots

These are hotspots where the number of people facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), or classified as moderately or severely food insecure under WFP's CARI methodology, is expected to increase during the outlook period, and contextual drivers are likely to further deteriorate; and/or the number of people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity, or identified as severely food insecure under WFP's CARI methodology, is expected to increase during the outlook period, while remaining below 500 000 people or below 10 percent of the population analysed (with at least 50 percent of the population analysed).

Situations requiring monitoring

Several other situations, while not identified as hunger hotspots, are assessed to merit close monitoring. These include:

- Situations where data are insufficient or unavailable to allow for a comparative assessment based on the applied quantitative methodology, but where a qualitative assessment of available evidence on acute food insecurity, acute malnutrition, conflict, displacement, climatic hazards, economic conditions, disease outbreaks and humanitarian-access constraints indicates a credible risk of worsening acute food insecurity during the outlook period, as determined by consensus during the regional selection meetings.
- Situations where recent acute food insecurity information is available, and where acute food insecurity is expected to persist or deteriorate during the outlook period. Although the combined assessment of acute food insecurity trends, contextual drivers and projected risks indicates a lower level of concern than in countries, territories and situations selected as hunger hotspots, these situations warrant close monitoring.

Source: Authors' own elaboration.

also raise the risk of flash floods during the outlook period. **The Southern Africa region** (Eswatini, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe) **and the Central American Dry Corridor** have been included due to the expected adverse impacts of El Niño on crop production and food security during the outlook period and beyond. **Lebanon** is no longer classified as a hunger hotspot, reflecting improvements in acute food insecurity since 2025, although levels remain high and widespread due to persistent displacement, economic challenges and the risk of renewed escalation.

Since the hunger hotspot categories were established in May 2022, 11 countries and territories have been selected as hunger hotspots of highest concern. Among them, **Haiti, Mali, Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Yemen** were at the highest level of concern for at least half of the past ten editions. **South Sudan** has remained consistently in this category since this classification was established (see Figure 2, and the dedicated box on historical coverage and country trends for more details). In this edition, Palestine is no longer considered a hotspot of highest concern, as acute food insecurity improved after the October 2025 ceasefire due to reduced conflict and expanded humanitarian assistance, despite persistently high needs and fragile gains.

In this edition, **Burkina Faso, Cuba, Ethiopia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Lebanon, the Niger, Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste** are classified as situations requiring monitoring.

The Hunger Hotspots report does not cover all countries, territories, situations or geographical areas experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity or protracted crises. In some cases, inclusion is constrained by limited data availability, data that do not meet the technical requirements of the analysis, or insufficient evidence on key drivers and contextual trends that indicate a credible risk of worsening acute food insecurity. Further details are available in the hotspot selection process appendix at the end of the report.

The cutoff date for analysis and information in this report was 25 November 2026.

Anticipatory action and emergency response

Targeted humanitarian action is urgently needed to save lives and livelihoods across all hunger hotspots. In hotspots of highest concern, such action is critical to prevent starvation and loss of life.

To support this, the report provides recommendations for anticipatory action and emergency response, tailored to the identified risks:

- **Anticipatory action** refers to short-term disaster risk management interventions implemented in the critical window between an early-warning trigger – when forecasts indicate a likely hazard – and the impact of that hazard on lives and livelihoods. These actions aim to protect the most vulnerable populations and their livelihoods before a shock occurs. In protracted crises, anticipatory action is recommended where appropriate.
- **Emergency response** involves actions aimed at addressing current or emerging humanitarian needs. The amount and duration of emergency assistance are determined through rapid assessments that provide information on food security and nutrition needs. Emergency response actions are, where relevant, adapted from interventions outlined in Humanitarian Needs and Response Plans (HNRPs).


Given the extended outlook period of this report, recommendations for both anticipatory action and emergency response are indicative. Anticipatory action recommendations are intended for implementation only if early-warning triggers are met or clear early-warning signs emerge. Some recommendations also include preparedness measures, which are crucial for enabling the timely and effective implementation of anticipatory action and emergency response.

Note: Anticipatory action recommendations are included only when the risk analysis identifies a hazard or shock that is likely to occur but has not yet materialized during the outlook period. If a hazard or shock has already impacted agricultural livelihoods and food security, the window for anticipatory action is considered closed – even if the effects are expected to persist into the present and future. In such cases, this report includes only emergency response recommendations.

Figure 2. Summary of hotspot categorization over the four most recent editions of Hunger Hotspots

2025

June–October




- SOUTH SUDAN
- SUDAN
- PALESTINE
- YEMEN
- HAITI
- NIGERIA
- SOMALIA
- MALI
- AFGHANISTAN
- DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
- MYANMAR
- CHAD
- SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
- BURKINA FASO
- MADAGASCAR
- BANGLADESH
- KENYA
- LEBANON
- UGANDA

REGIONAL RISKS

- DRY CORRIDOR
- SOUTHERN AFRICA

November–May 2026



- SOUTH SUDAN
- SUDAN
- PALESTINE
- YEMEN
- HAITI
- NIGERIA
- SOMALIA
- MALI
- AFGHANISTAN
- DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
- MYANMAR
- CHAD
- SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
- BURKINA FASO
- MADAGASCAR
- BANGLADESH
- KENYA
- LEBANON
- UGANDA

REGIONAL RISKS

- DRY CORRIDOR
- SOUTHERN AFRICA

2026

June–November



- SOUTH SUDAN
- SUDAN
- PALESTINE
- YEMEN
- HAITI
- NIGERIA
- SOMALIA
- MALI
- AFGHANISTAN
- DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
- MYANMAR
- CHAD
- SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
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- MADAGASCAR
- BANGLADESH
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- UGANDA

REGIONAL RISKS

- DRY CORRIDOR
- SOUTHERN AFRICA

December–May 2027



- SOUTH SUDAN
- SUDAN
- PALESTINE
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- NIGERIA
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- MADAGASCAR
- BANGLADESH
- KENYA
- LEBANON
- UGANDA

REGIONAL RISKS

- DRY CORRIDOR
- SOUTHERN AFRICA

Hotspot of highest concern · Hotspot of very high concern · Hotspot · Not a hotspot · Situation requiring monitoring

Highest levels of concern persist as humanitarian resources decline

The five countries identified as hunger hotspots of highest concern in this edition (Somalia, Yemen, South Sudan, the Sudan and Nigeria) have been repeatedly identified as part of this list since 2022. In these contexts, large-scale humanitarian assistance helped avert some of the worst outcomes but did not eliminate the risk of catastrophic food insecurity, which persisted or subsequently re-emerged. This recurrence has occurred alongside a decline of nearly two thirds in recorded humanitarian assistance for food security and nutrition in these five countries between 2022 and 2025, and of roughly three quarters when the Sudan is excluded. While conflict, economic shocks, climate extremes and access constraints have remained the primary drivers of these crises, declining humanitarian resources have reduced the capacity to sustain gains and mitigate worsening conditions. Sustained humanitarian assistance remains critical, but humanitarian action alone cannot break the cycle of recurrent crises observed in these contexts. Progress will also depend on renewed political commitment, intensified diplomatic efforts to prevent and resolve conflict, improved humanitarian access, and longer-term investments that strengthen resilience and livelihoods. As humanitarian resources decline, the protective buffer that previously helped avert some of the worst outcomes is weakening, increasing the risk that future shocks could translate into catastrophe.

Since the introduction of concern levels in May 2022, five countries currently classified as hunger hotspots of highest concern have been in this category in at least half of the past ten editions. South Sudan has remained in this category throughout all ten editions, while the Sudan has been classified at the highest concern level in eight editions. Nigeria, Somalia and Yemen have each been among the hotspots of highest concern in five or six of the past ten editions, highlighting the recurring or sustained nature of critically severe levels of acute food insecurity in these contexts.[a]

In these five countries, humanitarian assistance has played a critical role in responding to severe food crises and, alongside other factors, helped avert some of the worst outcomes. However, conflict and persistent access constraints underpin the fragility of the gains achieved, which further highlights the importance of sustained support to protect lives and livelihoods. Against this backdrop, recent reductions in humanitarian financing raise concerns about the capacity to maintain these responses and address renewed or escalating needs. As humanitarian funding reductions have been observed across the vast majority of the food crisis contexts since 2022,[1] in the five countries repeatedly classified at the highest level of concern, humanitarian assistance for food security and nutrition has declined by approximately 62 percent – from USD 5.1 billion in 2022 to USD 2.0 billion in 2025. This aggregate decline masks divergent trajectories: financing increased in the Sudan while falling especially sharply in Somalia, Yemen and Nigeria.[2] As highlighted below, these reductions in funding are coinciding with high levels of need in all of these contexts; the severity of acute food insecurity has persisted or worsened. These countries remain at the highest level of concern in December 2026–May 2027.


Nigeria was on the list of hunger hotspots of highest concern between May 2022 and October 2023 and between June 2026 and May 2027. Over these years, acute food insecurity has increased markedly, with the proportion of the population analysed facing Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) increasing from 12 percent in June–August 2022 to 16 percent in 2024 and 17 percent in 2026. This has been accompanied by a growing number of people facing Emergency (CH Phase 4) conditions.[3, 4, 5] After being reported in November 2022,[6] populations in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) were again reported in 2026 and projected to increase in 2027,[7] pointing to a continued deterioration in severity – notably in conflict-affected northern areas. At the same time, humanitarian assistance for food security and nutrition declined by approximately 74 percent – from USD 505 million in 2022 to USD 130 million in 2025 – despite worsening acute food insecurity and malnutrition.

In **Somalia**, identified as being of highest concern between May 2022 and October 2023, acute food insecurity reached particularly high levels during the 2022–2023 drought crisis, with large populations facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and

[a] Three other countries and territories – Haiti, Mali and Palestine – have each been among the hotspots of highest concern in five or six of the past ten editions. However, these contexts are not the focus of this section, as, despite persistently severe levels of acute food insecurity, they are no longer classified as hunger hotspots of highest concern in this edition.


Highest levels of concern persist as humanitarian resources decline (continued)

Figure 3. Number of editions covering the five hunger hotspots of highest concern and corresponding trends in humanitarian assistance to food sectors



Source: Authors' own elaboration based on previous editions of the Hunger Hotspots report and GNAFC (Global Network Against Food Crises). *Financing flows and food crises report: analysis of humanitarian and development financing flows* (forthcoming).

Figure 4. Trends in high acute food insecurity in the five hunger hotspots of highest concern



Source: FAO and WFP. 2026. *Hunger Hotspots analysis (December 2026 to May 2027)*. Rome.

Note: See Figure 6 for more details on country data.

Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). A risk of Famine was identified in 2022–2023, particularly in Bay, Bakool and some camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), but it was averted through large-scale multisectoral humanitarian assistance and improved *Gu* rainfall performance in 2023.[8] Following repeated poor rainy seasons, a risk of Famine was again identified in 2026 under a plausible worst-case scenario, highlighting continued vulnerability to renewed shocks, including drought and flood risks.[9] However, the November IPC update indicates that this risk is no longer expected through December 2026.[10] Humanitarian assistance for food security and nutrition peaked at approximately USD 1.56 billion in 2022, before declining to USD 127 million in 2025 – a reduction of approximately 92 percent from the peak, or 83 percent from 2023, despite continued high levels of acute food insecurity.

South Sudan has been on the highest concern list since 2022, with acute food insecurity remaining persistently high over this period, as large populations consistently face

Highest levels of concern persist as humanitarian resources decline (continued)

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and some populations are reported in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) every year over this period. A risk of Famine was identified in some areas in 2025 and persists into 2026 in the context of protracted conflict.[11, 12] However, humanitarian assistance for food security and nutrition declined markedly, by approximately 41 percent, from USD 714 million in 2022 to USD 425 million in 2025.

In the **Sudan**, acute food insecurity increased sharply following the outbreak of conflict in April 2023, reaching record levels in 2024–2025. After its first inclusion as a hunger hotspot of highest concern in May 2023, the crisis was marked by a rapid rise in populations facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4), alongside populations in Catastrophe and Famine (IPC Phase 5) conditions in Zamzam IDP camp near El Fasher in July 2024.[13, 14] From December 2024 to May 2025, Famine (IPC Phase 5) was projected in 10 areas, with another 17 areas at risk of Famine.[b, 15, 16] As of September 2025, Famine (IPC Phase 5) was ongoing in the cities of El Fasher and Kadugli and expected to persist through January 2026, while 20 areas across Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan were at risk of Famine.[17] Conditions in the besieged town of Dilling (South Kordofan) were estimated to be similar to those in Kadugli, but a lack of data prevented IPC classification of this area. As of May 2026, a risk of Famine persisted through September 2026 in 14 areas across North Darfur, South Darfur and South Kordofan, and through January 2027 in 13 areas under a reasonable worst-case scenario – characterized by intensified conflict and further restrictions on humanitarian access and the movement of goods and people.[18] Recorded humanitarian assistance for food security and nutrition more than doubled from USD 465 million in 2023 to USD 969 million in 2024, then remained broadly stable at USD 948 million in 2025, while the crisis remained exceptionally severe. However, significant gaps in assistance persist and as of early October 2026, the HNRP had received less than half the funds requested, with significant shortfalls in food security (funded at 42 percent), nutrition (30 percent) and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) (23 percent).[19] Where conflict restricts humanitarian access, funding trends alone therefore give an incomplete picture of response capacity.

Yemen was on the list of highest concern from May 2022 to October 2023 and again from November 2025 to May 2027. Acute food insecurity has remained persistently high over this period, with large populations experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) conditions and some populations facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) – reflecting the sustained severity of the crisis. In February 2022, a risk of Famine was identified in some districts of Hajjah governorate under the worst-case scenario. However, the scenario was averted due to an improvement in the security situation in conjunction with humanitarian assistance.[20, 21] Humanitarian assistance for food security and nutrition reached USD 1.62 billion in 2022 before declining sharply to USD 339 million in 2025 (a decline of approximately 79 percent), as Emergency levels persisted and Catastrophe-level outcomes reappeared in 2025–2026.

Overall, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Yemen and the Sudan have been identified as hunger hotspots of highest concern in most editions of this report, and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) levels of acute food insecurity have persisted or re-emerged in all five. This record points to contexts marked by fragility and structural vulnerability, where conflict and insecurity, weather extremes and economic shocks repeatedly push already vulnerable populations towards extreme levels of acute food insecurity. In several of these contexts, humanitarian assistance helped avert the worst outcomes, but the gains proved fragile and of limited duration: severe acute food insecurity risks – including risk of Famine – re-emerged within a few years, often as recorded assistance declined. Addressing immediate needs therefore requires sustained and predictable humanitarian assistance, alongside medium- and longer-term investments that strengthen livelihoods and agrifood systems, expand access to social protection and basic services, and tackle the underlying drivers of vulnerability. Importantly, renewed political commitment, intensified diplomatic efforts to prevent and resolve conflict and improved humanitarian access are key to reducing acute food insecurity in many hunger hotspots. Bringing these efforts together through coordinated action across humanitarian, development and, where relevant, peace actors is essential to save lives and protect livelihoods today, while progressively reducing dependence on emergency assistance over time.

[b] The Government of the Sudan did not endorse the findings of this analysis.

Global Network Against Food Crises

This report is part of a series of analytical products produced under the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) initiative, which aims to enhance and coordinate the generation and dissemination of evidence-based information and analysis to prevent and address food crises.

In September 2026, GNAFC released the *Global Report on Food Crises 2026 Mid-Year Update*. The report presents the number and share of the population analysed estimated to be facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 39 countries and territories out of the 47 countries covered in the *Global Report on Food Crises 2026* that had acute food insecurity data in 2026.

The report is available at:
www.fightfoodcrises.net/global-report-food-crises

While the *Global Report on Food Crises* provides a retrospective, evidence-based overview of food crisis countries – reporting on the previous year's food security situation and offering preliminary forecasts for the current year – the *Hunger Hotspots* report offers a complementary forward-looking, early warning analysis. It identifies countries and contexts where acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate over a six-month outlook period.





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Upcoming trends in acute food insecurity drivers

Organized violence and conflict risks

In the outlook period, armed violence remains a primary driver of acute food insecurity in **12 of the 16 hunger hotspots**, driving large-scale displacement, impacting humanitarian access and disrupting agricultural production and market functioning.

By the end of June 2026, an estimated 118.2 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide,[22] many of whom faced high levels of acute food insecurity.[23] This represents a slight increase from the end of 2025 and means that one in every 70 people globally faces forced displacement.[24]

From January to October 2026, the number of political violence events recorded globally increased by more than 15 percent compared with the same period in 2025,[25] following a near-doubling of global conflict levels over the preceding five years.[26] The intensification of conflict and violence in several contexts has prompted alarming levels of displacement in recent months. In South Sudan, heavy fighting has displaced about 484 000 people since January 2026.[27] In Yemen, escalating fighting has displaced more than 300 000 individuals since August.[28] While the Sudan's IDP population remains at a record 8.6 million, the figure has decreased compared with previous years, mainly due to rising return movements. At the same time, conflict continued triggering new displacement in 2026, particularly in Blue Nile, Darfur and Kordofan.[29] Furthermore, the escalation of conflict in the Middle East alone triggered more than 4 million temporary population movements within the Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanon in March 2026.[30, 31]

Conflict-driven access constraints, restrictions on humanitarian operations and declining funding are increasingly limiting assistance delivery. This is forcing significant reductions in support, including for populations facing the most severe levels of acute food insecurity. Conflict continues to drive populations into extreme levels of acute food insecurity in some of the most critical and protracted crisis contexts, including Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Yemen.

During the outlook period, acute food insecurity in the **Sudan** is expected to remain at extreme levels. Ongoing conflict continues to drive displacement and disrupt livelihoods, markets and agricultural activities,[32, 33] particularly in Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan.[34]

Intensifying violence, increasingly constrained humanitarian access and rising displacement are expected to further exacerbate already extreme levels of acute food insecurity in **South Sudan**, with populations across four counties of Upper Nile and Jonglei states remaining at risk of Famine as of mid-2026.[35] In **Somalia**, localized conflict and political tensions are expected to undermine stability and heighten acute food insecurity amid spiking food prices and flooding risks.[36]

In **northern Nigeria**, acute food insecurity is expected to remain at high levels, as armed violence continues to drive displacement, disrupt livelihoods and sustain elevated food prices. Pockets of the population in Borno State are classified as being in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in October–December 2026, with the number of people in this phase projected to increase through June–August 2027.[37]
In **Chad**, acute food insecurity is likely to remain concerning due to persistent conflict and displacement; these are expected to continue disrupting livelihoods and restricting access to farmland, fishing grounds, pasture and markets due to the spill-over of the Sudan crisis and localized insecurity.[38, 39]
In **Mali**, acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate due to escalating conflict, posing significant risks of violence against civilians, forced displacement and destruction of economic assets and livelihoods.[40, 41]

In **Yemen**, protracted conflict remained a key driver of widespread acute food insecurity at critical levels, with catastrophic levels projected among pockets of the population in Al Hudaydah, Amran and Hajjah governorates in early 2026.[42] Recent escalations in hostilities have caused further displacement and are expected to further worsen food security and nutrition outcomes, particularly in southwestern areas.[43]

Violence is also expected to continue driving humanitarian needs in the eastern **Democratic Republic of the Congo**,[44] compounded by the Ebola outbreak.[45]

In **Palestine**, continued low-intensity conflict, displacement and widespread livelihood collapse are expected to keep the vast majority of the population in the Gaza Strip acutely food insecure and heavily reliant on humanitarian assistance,[46] while acute food insecurity in the West Bank is likely to worsen amid increasing violence, economic deterioration and declining assistance.[47] In **Afghanistan**, border insecurity is expected to remain high, driving further displacement, disrupting economic activities and constraining humanitarian access amid ongoing cross-border tensions with Pakistan.[48] In **Myanmar**, conflict is expected to remain intense in western areas and expand into central parts of the country,[49] further restricting access to farmland, markets and livelihood opportunities amid severe humanitarian access constraints.[50] In **Haiti**, escalating gang violence amid uncertainty over the electoral timetable is likely to further restrict humanitarian operations,[51, 52] limit access to agricultural land and drive additional displacement, with the number of IDPs already at a record high.

Economic risks

While the impacts will vary across countries, elevated costs for energy, fertilizer and transport, together with El Niño-related risks to production, could further undermine household purchasing power in several hunger hotspots during the outlook period. High debt and rising borrowing costs also limit governments' capacity to respond. In September, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development projected global growth to slow from 3.4 percent in 2025 to 2.9 percent in 2026, before edging up to 3 percent in 2027.[53] By the end of 2026, one-third of low-income economies and half of fragile and conflict-affected economies are projected to be poorer than in 2019.[54]

The FAO Food Price Index averaged 133.9 points in October 2026, down 1.2 percent from September but 5.9 percent higher year on year. Cereal, dairy and meat prices declined, while vegetable oil prices edged up and sugar prices rose sharply, amid continued logistical disruptions and increasing weather-related risks.[55, 56] A very strong El Niño, now over 90 percent likely,[57] is a downside risk to agricultural production and, together with continued disruptions to fertilizer supply, could add to food price pressures during the outlook period.[58]

According to the World Bank's October 2026 update, the latest available quarterly data indicate that food price inflation exceeded headline inflation in approximately 22 percent of the 150 countries analysed, compared with 14 percent in the preceding period, indicating increased pressure on food affordability.[59] Global shocks typically feed through to domestic food prices with a lag, so price pressures may continue over the coming months, including into the outlook period.[60]

Brent crude averaged about USD 115.3 per barrel as of end-October against USD 71 in February,[61] and a full recovery in Middle East supplies is only expected in 2027.[62] Shipping disruptions now span the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea and the Black Sea, and additional restrictions are likely in the Panama Canal, depending on water availability – raising freight and import costs.[63, 64] Urea prices are back to early-2026 levels. However, with Gulf fertilizer shipments still largely halted, nitrogen demand for upcoming planting seasons could push them up again if the strait remains closed.[65, 66]

Fiscal buffers are thin: global public debt reached just under 94 percent of gross domestic product in 2025;[67] about half of low- and middle-income countries are in, or at high risk of, debt distress;[68] and benchmark borrowing costs are rising, with the first increase in United States policy rates since July 2023.[69, 70]

In hunger hotspots, these pressures compound country-specific shocks.

In **Asia and the Pacific**, limited employment, reduced development spending and border-related trade disruptions with Pakistan are weakening purchasing power in Afghanistan, where incomes have fallen year on year, according to recent FAO household surveys.[71, 72, 73] In **Myanmar**, dependence on imported fuel and fertilizers has transmitted the Middle East crisis to prices: the national food basket cost 30 percent more in September than before the crisis, with diesel prices in early October more than 80 percent higher than in the last week of February.[74, 75, 76, 77]

In **Eastern Africa**, conflict in **Somalia**'s Middle Shabelle and Hiiraan regions is disrupting key supply routes and raising food and transport costs,[78] while sorghum and maize prices in some markets had roughly doubled year on year by July 2026.[79] In **South Sudan**, the national currency is weak and food prices are high due to import reliance and the impact of the Middle East conflict;[80, 81] diesel prices in Juba more than doubled between February and August 2026.[82] In **Uganda**, poor harvests are expected to raise market dependence, amid higher year-on-year staple food prices,[83] while livestock prices and livestock sales income have declined.[84]

In **Latin America and the Caribbean**, **Haiti**'s economy has contracted for the eighth consecutive year,[85] fuel prices have risen sharply[86] and increasing numbers of forced returnees are likely to reduce remittances.[87, 88] In the **Central American Dry Corridor**, high food, fuel and input costs are impinging on food access, compounded by El Niño-related crop losses.[89, 90, 91, 92]

In the **Near East and North Africa**, sorghum prices in the **Sudan** had more than doubled in a year by August 2026, mainly due to conflict and higher fuel costs linked to the Middle East conflict.[93] In **Yemen**, the conflict escalation threatens Red Sea shipping, raising import costs.[94] Renewed currency depreciation could undermine food affordability.[95] In **Palestine**, conflict-related market disruptions are expected to keep eroding purchasing power in the Gaza Strip,[96] while widespread reductions in incomes are reported in the West Bank.[97, 98]

In **Southern Africa**, rising food inflation is expected to worsen food access during the lean season in **Madagascar.**[99] Elsewhere in the region, abundant cereal supplies have kept staple prices generally below year-earlier levels, but prices remain elevated in some deficit-producing and import-dependent areas, and limited income opportunities already constrain food access.[100, 101, 102]

In **West Africa and the Sahel**, insecurity along trade corridors and a weak naira are expected to keep food and fuel prices high in northern **Nigeria**, where low incomes are further eroding purchasing power.[103] In **Chad**, the Sudan crisis is expected to sustain pressure on markets in the east.[104] In **Mali**, transport costs have been driven higher by conflict-related disruptions to fuel supplies, while cereal prices are expected to remain near or above the five-year average.[105, 106]

Natural hazard risks

Climate-related shocks are expected to contribute to worsening acute food insecurity during the outlook period, primarily channelled through reduced crop harvests and disruptions to agricultural livelihoods – affecting both food availability and access. El Niño-related rainfall deficits and elevated temperatures have already contributed to crop losses in the Central American Dry Corridor and Eastern Africa and are also threatening the upcoming agricultural season in Southern Africa; conversely, a shift towards wetter conditions between October and December is expected to increase flood risks in parts of Eastern Africa. Losses from earlier rainfall deficits and flooding will also leave some households with reduced food stocks and lower incomes, constraining food access. Limited assistance to households affected by climate hazards could restrict their recovery.[107, 108]

In **Southern Africa**, below-average rainfall and elevated temperatures during the 2026/27 agricultural season could delay planting, reduce cultivated areas and curtail crop yields, while agricultural labour opportunities are also expected to be reduced – with negative implications for rural households' incomes. Concerns are particularly high in **Zimbabwe**, southern and western **Zambia**, southern **Malawi**, central and southern **Mozambique** and **Eswatini**. In the outlook period, reduced agricultural incomes and constrained water and pasture availability for livestock could worsen food access during the lean season (October to March). Poor harvests towards the end of the outlook would likely limit income-earning opportunities owing to reduced crop sales, while below-average own production would reduce food supplies households typically rely on for consumption. In southern **Madagascar**, further rainfall deficits would compound the impacts of production losses in 2026, increasing market dependence while reducing agricultural earnings. El Niño is expected to reduce tropical cyclone activity, lowering landfall risk for Madagascar and Mozambique, although damaging events remain possible. In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, localized flooding associated with wetter conditions in late 2026 could damage crops and infrastructure and further restrict market access in areas already affected by conflict and displacement.[109, 110, 111, 112, 113]

In **Eastern Africa**, above-average *Deyr* rainfall could support crops outside flood-affected areas and improve pasture and water availability in **Somalia**. However, riverine flooding and flash floods could disrupt cultivation, damage crops and reduce agricultural income, reducing the seasonal improvements expected with the harvest from January 2027. Flooding could also displace households and interrupt markets and humanitarian assistance, particularly in exposed settlements. In **South Sudan**, drought-related production losses and localized flooding could limit the relief provided by late-2026 harvests, leaving households unable to meet their food needs. In **Uganda's** Karamoja region, wetter conditions may improve pastoral resources but cannot compensate for the effects of crop losses earlier in 2026, leaving households with limited food stocks and increased dependence on markets during the outlook period.[114, 115, 116, 117]

In **West Africa and the Sahel**, localized rainfall deficits, dry spells and disrupted crop establishment have added to insecurity and input constraints affecting the 2026 agricultural season in **Chad**, **Mali** and northern **Nigeria**. Localized production shortfalls could leave households with less food for consumption and reduced crop-sale earnings, limiting post-harvest improvements in food security. Inadequate

pasture and water replenishment could also weaken livestock productivity and household incomes as the dry season progresses.[118, 119, 120]

In **Central America and the Caribbean**, losses from the 2026 *Primera* season have already weakened household food stocks and agricultural incomes in the **Central American Dry Corridor**. Below-average and erratic rainfall threatens *Postrera* production, potentially limiting the replenishment of stocks and the income normally earned from seasonal agricultural activities. Successive poor harvests could bring forward the 2027 lean season and prolong market dependence, leaving poor households increasingly exposed to high food and production costs. In **Haiti**, rainfall deficits and elevated temperatures could further reduce harvests and agricultural earnings, leaving households with fewer resources to meet food needs during the outlook.[121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126]

In **Asia and the Pacific**, wetter conditions could support winter crop establishment and spring planting in **Afghanistan;** however, elevated temperatures may limit snow accumulation and subsequent irrigation water availability, posing localized risks to production. Any resulting production constraints would compound already weak purchasing power. In **Myanmar**, localized crop losses from earlier flooding could continue to constrain food stocks and agricultural livelihoods where civil insecurity limits recovery, despite relatively favourable national production prospects.[127, 128, 129]

In the **Near East**, rainfall deficits in key cropping areas of the **Sudan** have compounded conflict-related agricultural constraints. Expected production shortfalls could limit food availability and the extent of seasonal price declines following the harvest. In **Yemen**, lingering flood damage and elevated temperatures could reduce crop and livestock productivity, while renewed localized flooding, particularly in western areas during March–May 2027, could interrupt recovery and market access. In **Palestine**, amid the collapse of food, health and sanitation systems in the Gaza Strip,[130] winter rains and localized flooding could worsen conditions for displaced households – damaging inadequate shelters and further disrupting essential services and humanitarian operations.[131, 132, 133, 134]


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El Niño-related risks to agriculture and food security



El Niño is a natural climate phenomenon driven by unusually warm surface waters in the central and eastern equatorial Pacific, with widespread impacts on global weather patterns.[135] Having developed by early June 2026, El Niño has since strengthened, with a 98 percent probability of reaching very strong intensity during October–December 2026; it could rank among the most intense events on record, threatening food security during the December 2026–May 2027 outlook and beyond.[136] Its effects will coincide with critical agricultural seasons, putting harvests, livestock and rural incomes at risk. In the most affected areas, disrupted planting is likely to reduce agricultural employment and household incomes, while lower crop and livestock production could accelerate food-stock depletion and prolong market dependence. Preliminary analysis estimates that El Niño could push 49 million more people into acute food insecurity by the end of 2027.[137]


In Southern Africa, reduced rains and heat are likely to affect the main growing season. This could reduce on-farm earnings in 2026 and increase the risk of poor harvests in 2027, with adverse implications for local food supplies and prices. In the Central American Dry Corridor, further *Postrera* season crop losses would compound *Primera* season damage, potentially bringing forward the 2027 lean season. In Eastern Africa, heavier rains are expected to support the recovery of pastoral resources following El Niño-related dry conditions between June and September 2026 in parts of the region; however, severe flooding may also destroy crops, displace families and interrupt markets and assistance, undermining recovery from earlier drought. Across parts of South and Southeast Asia, rainfall deficits and heat are likely to reduce harvests and rural incomes. Wetter conditions could benefit winter and spring crops in Central Asia, while heat and localized flooding in parts of the Near East could further strain agricultural livelihoods and food access already undermined by conflict.[138, 139, 140]

The consequences of El Niño could extend beyond communities directly exposed. Production losses in major exporting countries could reduce regional supplies, increase import requirements and raise prices.[141] These risks coincide with elevated energy and fertilizer costs, linked partly to the Middle East crisis, which are already constraining agricultural investment and raising transport costs.[142] Farmers facing expensive inputs and unreliable rainfall may plant less and reduce fertilizer use. Conflict, displacement, depleted assets and reduced assistance leave many with little capacity to withstand these pressures.[143, 144, 145]

Anticipatory action can prevent these losses from becoming prolonged food crises when millions are already facing acute food insecurity. Timely assistance, adapted seeds, livestock protection and tailored measures to safeguard water supplies and food stocks can help vulnerable households protect livelihoods, stabilize food consumption, safeguard agricultural production and strengthen resilience to future shocks. Experience from previous events shows that anticipatory action can reduce significant losses and subsequent response costs.[146] The El Niño FAO–WFP anticipatory action appeal provides a comprehensive framework for scaling up anticipatory action, seeking to protect 9 million people across 22 prioritized countries. It complements broader preparedness efforts across contexts exposed to El Niño-related risks.[147, 148] As of late October 2026, the FAO–WFP plan faced a funding gap of around USD 125 million. Immediate priorities include Mozambique, Uganda, Zimbabwe, South Sudan, Somalia, Madagascar and Malawi, while Afghanistan may become a priority in the coming months. In the Central American Dry Corridor and Haiti, anticipatory action windows are currently closed but are expected to reopen in early 2027.

Figure 5. Number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in hunger hotspots

In 2026–2027 (where available, most recent data), in millions[1]



Source: FAO and WFP. 2026. *Hunger Hotspots analysis (December 2026 to May 2027)*. Rome.

- IPC/CH Phase 3 or equivalent
- IPC/CH Phase 4 or equivalent
- IPC/CH Phase 5 or equivalent
- IPC Phase 3 or above, compatible with IPC classifications, based on Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) analysis

NOTES

1 The data presented reflect the most recent projections available and are from 2025 and 2026.

2 For Nigeria, the CH analysis covers 26 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), though the hunger hotspot was identified in northern regions only.

3 For the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the IPC analysis covers the entire country, while the hunger hotspot was identified in Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu and Tshopo provinces only.

4 For the Sudan, these IPC figures reflect the latest countrywide analysis available as of November 2026, though the latest projection for October 2026–January 2027 covers a significantly smaller area, i.e. 56 localities and IDP settlements representing around 8.3 million people.

5 The figures reported in this chart for Yemen are based on the June 2025 IPC analysis and take into account the updated national population figure of 35.2 million people used in the 2026 HNRP, published in March 2026.

6 For Myanmar, data are based on a pre-analysis conducted under the HNRP, which served as the basis for results generation for the Myanmar HNRP 2027.

7 For Somalia, the latest figures reported do not represent peak levels. Peak numbers are presented in Figure 6 on page 17.

8 For Uganda, the IPC data are provided for refugee settlements, host communities and selected regional districts, including Karamoja, while the hunger hotspot was identified for Karamoja only.

9 For Madagascar, the IPC data are provided at the national level, though the hunger hotspot was identified for southern districts only.

10 For Chad, these figures also include estimates for refugees and returnees derived from an additional CH analysis.

11 For Zimbabwe, no severity disaggregation is available. This estimate corresponds to the upper bound of a range.

12 For Mozambique, the IPC analysis covers 46 districts among the most affected by the shocks that occurred up to June 2026.

13 For Palestine (Gaza Strip), the latest figures reported do not represent peak levels. Peak numbers are presented in Figure 7 on page 20.

14 For Zambia, the IPC analysis covers 93 of the 116 districts.

15 Prevalence is expressed as a percentage of the population analysed.

The IPC technical manual provides guidance on where each indicator sits within the IPC analytical framework. For details see: https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc/technical/manual_en.



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Hunger hotspots of highest concern

In the **Sudan**, acute food insecurity is expected to remain extreme, with a risk of Famine persisting in 13 areas and IDP settlements across North Darfur and South Kordofan through January 2027, under a reasonable worst-case scenario.[149, c] Conflict will remain the main driver, sustaining displacement and disrupting livelihoods, markets and agriculture,[150, 151] while drought conditions,[152] cereal production shortfalls and exceptionally high food prices further constrain food access.[153] The latest nationwide IPC analysis estimated that 19.5 million people, or 41 percent of the population, faced Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in February–May 2026, including over 5 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and nearly 135 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). The geographically limited October 2026–January 2027 projection – covering only 56 of the 195 localities and IDP settlements covered by the previous analysis period – estimated that 4.9 million people would face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including over 1.7 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and over 71 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) during the harvest.[154] Moreover, the October 2026 IPC Alert reported acute malnutrition levels above Famine thresholds in two IDP camps in South Darfur.[155]


In **South Sudan**, acute food insecurity is expected to remain extremely severe, driven by high-intensity conflict and extreme humanitarian access constraints, compounded by climatic shocks, high food prices and macroeconomic challenges. Conflict in Jonglei and Upper Nile is expected to sustain displacement and disrupt livelihoods and markets.[156, 157] El Niño-related rainfall deficits have weakened crop prospects,[158] while funding shortfalls risk widening response gaps.[159, 160] The latest available IPC analysis projected that, from April to July 2026, 7.8 million people (55 percent of the population analysed) would face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 2.5 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 73 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).[161] The same analysis identified a credible risk of Famine in Luakpiny/Nasir, Ulang, Akobo and Nyirol counties under a worst-case scenario through July 2026.[162]



[c] The Government of the Sudan did not endorse this analysis.

Figure 6. Trends in high acute food insecurity in hunger hotspots of highest concern

2020–2027[1] peak numbers and prevalence



NOTES

1 Data for 2026 are considered the expected peak based on information available as of November 2026. Countries are ordered first according to whether they face a risk of Famine and second according to the size of the population classified or projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5).

2 Data for 2020–2022 and 2025–2026 come from IPC; data for 2023 come from FEWS NET and correspond to the upper bound of a range; data for 2024 come from IPC and the Food Security Cluster. Comparability is limited. The 2025–2026 figures reported in this chart correspond to the same analysis and take into account the updated national population figure of 35.2 million people used in the 2026 HNRP, published in March 2026.

3 Geographical coverage increased from 16 states and the FCT in 2020 to 27 states and the FCT in 2026 and decreased to 26 states and the FCT in 2027; therefore, comparability is limited.

Comparison over time indicates a general trend; however, comparability issues exist in terms of:

(i) Coverage for Nigeria: population coverage varied from 49 percent in 2020 to 73 percent in 2021, 91 percent in 2023, 89 percent in 2025 and 79 percent in 2026.

(ii) Analysis time periods differ for Nigeria, Somalia, the Sudan and Yemen.

Caution in reading and using this analysis should be observed. Trends in prevalence and total numbers can diverge due to changes in the population covered.

Source: FAO and WFP. 2026. *Hunger Hotspots analysis (December 2026 to May 2027)*. Rome.


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In **Yemen**, acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate, driven by escalating conflict and compounded by the adverse economic impact of the regional crisis, climatic shocks, humanitarian funding shortfalls and extreme access constraints.[163, 164] Renewed violence since August 2026 has displaced more than 300 000 people.[165] The escalation is expected to drive further displacement and refugee outflows,[166, 167] disrupt trade and imports and further constrain humanitarian access.[168] In areas controlled by the Government of Yemen (GoY), 5.4 million people (51 percent of the population analysed) are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in October–December 2026,[169] including 1.8 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) – up from 1.6 million during September 2025–February 2026.[170, 171] No recent analysis is available for areas controlled by the de facto authorities (DFA). The latest nationwide projection, covering the period through February 2026, indicated that 18.3 million people, or 52 percent of the country's population, would face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 5.5 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and over 41 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).[172, 173, 174, 175]

In **Nigeria (northern regions)**, acute food insecurity is expected to remain high. Pockets of the population in Borno State are classified as being in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) during October–December 2026, with the number of people in this phase projected to increase by June–August 2027.[176] Conflict and insecurity are expected to remain the main drivers across the North East, North West and North Central,[177] sustaining displacement[178] and disrupting livelihoods and agricultural production amid very high humanitarian access constraints.[179] High food prices and low incomes will continue to constrain household food access.[180] During June–August 2027, across the 26 states and the FCT analysed, 33.5 million people (16 percent of the population analysed) are projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), including 1.5 million in Emergency (CH Phase 4) located in the northeast and northwest and over 40 000 in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in Borno State.[181]

In **Somalia**, acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate, driven by El Niño-related flooding, conflict, high food and fuel prices, the effects of previous droughts and declining humanitarian assistance.[182] During October–December 2026, 5.3 million people (27 percent of the population analysed) are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including nearly 1.5 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).[183] Acute malnutrition levels are expected to remain high, affecting around 1.9 million children aged 6–59 months between July 2026 and June 2027.[184] Well-above-average *Deyr* rains are expected to increase flood risks, potentially driving displacement, livelihood losses and access constraints,[185] while improving pasture, water availability and crop prospects in non-flooded areas. Conflict and insecurity are also expected to disrupt trade, agricultural activities and humanitarian access.[186, 187]

Hunger hotspots of very high concern

In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, critical levels of acute food insecurity are expected to persist, driven by protracted conflict, displacement and restricted humanitarian access.[188, 189] The Ebola outbreak may further constrain food access, while El Niño-related rainfall increases localized flood risks.[190, 191] These pressures are expected to keep food access constrained and limit agricultural production, especially in conflict-affected areas, during the outlook period.[192] According to the latest analysis, over 4.2 million people are projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) countrywide between January and June 2027.[193]

In **Afghanistan**, acute food insecurity is at risk of deteriorating as regional instability, border disruptions and large-scale returns constrain trade, livelihoods and household purchasing power, compounded by reduced humanitarian assistance.[194, 195, 196, 197] Falling incomes and rising food prices are increasingly constraining access to food and the ability to meet other basic needs.[198] During November 2026–April 2027, 5.1 million people are expected to experience Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity.[199] Border insecurity is expected to persist, causing further displacement and disrupting economic and humanitarian activity.


In **Haiti**, record levels of acute food insecurity are likely to persist due to expanding gang violence driving internal displacement and constraining humanitarian access. Amid increasing operations by the UN-backed Gang Suppression Force and uncertainty over the electoral timetable, violence is expected to intensify.[200, 201, 202, 203] Rural attacks have disrupted agricultural supply chains and forced people to flee, with a record 1.5 million IDPs as of August 2026.[204] A protracted economic crisis and below-average rainfall linked to El Niño between December 2026 and March 2027,[205, 206] compounded by significant funding gaps, are likely to further limit food access and availability. Between March and June 2027, 2 million people are projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4).[207]

In **Palestine**, acute food insecurity is expected to remain severe in the Gaza Strip and deteriorate further in the West Bank, driven by conflict and insecurity, reduced assistance, livelihood losses and constrained purchasing power.[208] In the Gaza Strip, continued conflict, displacement and market disruptions are expected to sustain dependence on humanitarian assistance, while agricultural recovery remains extremely limited.[209, 210] About 212 000 people in the Gaza Strip are projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) during July–December 2026.[211] In the West Bank, military operations, settler violence, funding cuts and income losses are expected to further constrain food access and worsen acute food insecurity.[212, 213]


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Figure 7. Trends in high levels of acute food insecurity in hunger hotspots of very high concern

2020–2027[1] peak numbers and prevalence



NOTES

1 Data for 2026–2027 represent the expected peak based on information available as of November 2026. Countries are ordered by the number of people classified or projected to face Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4).

2 The 2022 and 2023 peak data refer to the same analysis.

3 Geographical coverage increased from 85 territories and 18 urban areas in 2020 to 145 territories and 41 urban areas in 2025 and a total of 188 units of analysis in 2026–2027; therefore, comparability is limited.

4 Data for 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026 come from IPC analyses. Data for 2022 are from Humanitarian Needs Overviews, while data for 2020 and 2021 are based on the Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey methodology, with acute food insecurity prevalence referring to households rather than individuals. These sources apply different methodologies, which limits comparability. The 2020 and 2021 figures refer to the same analysis (the 2020 Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey, published in 2021); therefore, the 2020 estimate does not align with the source used in the Global Report on Food Crises 2021.

Comparison over time indicates a general trend; however, comparability issues exist in terms of:

(i) Geographical and population coverage. In Haiti, IPC analyses covered 87–93 percent of the population in 2020–2023, compared with 100 percent in 2024–2026. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, coverage ranged from 65 percent of the population in 2020 to 91–99 percent in 2022–2027. In the Gaza Strip, given the inability to classify North Gaza in 2025, the number of people reported as facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) is an underestimate and includes only the populations analysed and classified in Gaza, Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis governorates. It excludes any remaining population in Rafah, which is largely uninhabited.

(ii) Analysis periods. Analysis periods differ for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti and Palestine (Gaza Strip).

These comparisons should therefore be interpreted and used with caution. Trends in prevalence and absolute numbers can diverge due to changes in the population covered. Populations classified as moderately or severely food insecure under WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an approximation of populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above).

Source: FAO and WFP. 2026. *Hunger Hotspots analysis (December 2026 to May 2027)*. Rome.

Other countries or situations that require monitoring

Papua New Guinea

Despite limited recent data, acute food insecurity is at risk of worsening during the outlook period. An estimated 5.5 million people – 53 percent of the population – are affected by or at high risk of drought,[214] with approximately 1.2 million expected to require direct food relief by early 2027.[215] Forecasts indicate below-average rainfall across much of the region, with a heightened risk of worsening drought conditions during the 2026/27 rainy season, particularly in southern areas of the country.[216, 217] Crop losses, rising food prices and declining food reserves are reported, with the largest acute food insecurity impacts expected from November 2026.[218] With staple crops cultivated year-round, cumulative rainfall deficits could progressively reduce crop production and household food stocks. Rising food prices and elevated fuel and transport costs could constrain food access, and water shortages could exacerbate health and nutrition risks.[219, 220]

Timor-Leste

Despite limited data,[221] the acute food insecurity situation is at risk of deterioration among vulnerable households during the outlook period and beyond. The ongoing El Niño is expected to increase the likelihood of below-normal rainfall and elevated temperatures. This would affect yields of the 2026 off-season crops, disrupt planting and early development of crops during the 2026/27 main cropping season and constrain water availability and agricultural livelihoods.[222, 223] This would in turn weaken rural household food stocks and incomes during the outlook and beyond, despite imports meeting around 60 percent of cereal consumption and helping buffer national supplies.[224, 225, 226]

Ethiopia

While recent nationwide estimates of acute food insecurity are not available, escalating conflict, climate shocks and economic pressures could worsen acute food insecurity and malnutrition.[227, 228] Renewed conflict in northern Ethiopia is disrupting livelihoods and humanitarian operations and may drive further displacement.[229] The June–September *kiremt* season improved from late July in some northern and western areas, while rainfall deficits reduced crop prospects in central and eastern areas and worsened livestock conditions in pastoral areas. The October *meher* harvest should temporarily improve food availability, although below-average production will limit these gains, while reduced agricultural labour income may further constrain food access.[230] Above-average October–December rainfall should improve pasture and water availability in southern and southeastern areas, while increasing flood risks.[231] Annual food inflation reached 14.1 percent in October 2026, continuing to constrain purchasing power.[232] Funding gaps may limit humanitarian assistance during the outlook period.[233, 234]

Cuba

Despite persistent data limitations, energy, economic and climate-related pressures may increase risks of acute food insecurity outcomes in Cuba during the outlook period.[235, 236, 237] Recurrent shortages in subsidized food distributions may further constrain food availability, while elevated food prices continue to erode household purchasing power.[238] Since January 2026, fuel-import restrictions have triggered seven nationwide grid collapses, undermining food preservation, agriculture, imports and basic services.[239, 240] Following drier and hotter-than-usual conditions from May to July 2026, above-average rainfall was forecast through October, potentially easing drought but increasing the risk of flash flooding, crop damage and strain on energy and water services ahead of the outlook period.[241, 242, 243]

Islamic Republic of Iran

Despite the lack of recent acute food insecurity data, renewed hostilities and regional tensions could place additional pressure on vulnerable households through displacement and damage to civilian infrastructure; this would increase the risk of constrained access to essential services, commodities and humanitarian assistance.[244, 245] While food remains available in markets, sharp currency depreciation and rapidly rising prices – outpacing income adjustments – are likely to continue undermining affordability, especially for low-income households. Food inflation stood at 121 percent year on year in September 2026, while the cost of the food basket was more than 140 percent higher than a year earlier.[246] High input and transport costs are also likely to weigh on the 2026/27 winter cereal production.[247] Limited livelihood opportunities and financial insecurity are likely to continue affecting refugees from Afghanistan and vulnerable local communities.[248, 249]

Lebanon

Acute food insecurity is expected to remain elevated. An estimated 1.1 million people (24 percent of the population analysed), including Lebanese nationals, Syrian and Palestinian refugees and new arrivals from Syria post-December 2024, are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) during March–July 2027 – including about 97 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) – while over 330 000 people remained internally displaced as of October 2026.[250, 251, 252, 253] Conflict-driven economic contraction, elevated food and fuel costs and weak purchasing power are expected to continue hindering food access, mostly among vulnerable households,[254] while renewed escalation could trigger further displacement and worsen acute food insecurity. Humanitarian access is also likely to remain constrained, disrupting aid delivery – particularly in southern areas – and heightening households' vulnerability to worsening acute food insecurity.[255]

Burkina Faso

Although no updated acute food insecurity analysis is available, high levels of acute food insecurity are likely to persist, particularly in northern and eastern areas, where conflict is expected to continue disrupting livelihoods and the movement of people and goods.[256, 257] Poor harvests and supply delays are likely to reduce local food availability, while high transport costs are expected to drive up prices[258, 259] and further limit food access, amid very high humanitarian access constraints[260] and funding gaps.[261] Nationwide, cereal production in 2026 is expected to be affected by reduced plantings following the delayed onset and poor temporal and geographical distribution of rainfall[262] and potentially by limited access to fertilizers,[263] while below-average cumulative rainfall amounts and prolonged dry spells are anticipated to reduce crop yields in several areas.[264, 265] Accelerated depletion of pastoral resources could reduce livestock productivity and incomes, constraining food access.[266] Although prices of key staple cereals remain generally below their five-year average, they are still relatively high and exceed this benchmark in hard-to-reach areas, further constraining food access for vulnerable households.

Niger

Acute food insecurity remains a major concern. An estimated 2.4 million people (9 percent of the population analysed) were projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) from June to August 2026, including around 19 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4).[267] Ongoing insecurity in Tillabéri, Tahoua and Diffa is expected to drive further internal displacement.[268] As of the end of September 2026, the country hosted nearly 1.1 million forcibly displaced persons, up 17 percent year on year,[269, 270] straining local resources and food access amid severe funding gaps.[271, 272] Dry spells and insecurity-related restrictions on access to farmland and pastoral resources will likely cause shortfalls in crop and livestock production, in particular in these three regions,[273] while trade disruptions may further reduce food supplies and drive up prices in conflict-affected areas.[274, 275, 276] Accelerated depletion of pastoral resources is likely to trigger earlier-than-usual population and livestock movements, exacerbating competition over resources and increasing conflict risks between pastoralists and farmers.[277]



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Country risk narratives

Asia and the Pacific

Afghanistan

HOTSPOT OF VERY HIGH CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: regional conflict and economic stress

Acute food insecurity is at risk of deteriorating during the outlook period, as continued regional instability, border disruptions and large-scale returns constrain trade, livelihoods and household purchasing power, compounded by reduced humanitarian assistance.

Limited employment, reduced development spending and disruptions to trade and population movement linked to border tensions with Pakistan weigh on incomes and raise transport and food costs, weakening household purchasing power.[278, 279] Funding shortfalls have reduced humanitarian assistance, including for populations facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) acute food insecurity.[280] As of September 2026, over 50 percent of surveyed households reported a year-on-year decrease in their main source of income, while over 60 percent cited higher food prices as a shock.[281, 282]

Wheat production in 2025/26 is estimated to be above the five-year average, reflecting conducive March–August 2026 weather. Above-average rainfall associated with El Niño is forecast for late 2026 and early 2027, likely supporting 2026/27 winter crop establishment and spring crop planting.[283] Meanwhile, above-average temperatures could limit snow accumulation – reducing irrigation water availability for spring and summer crops – while heavier rainfall may increase localized flooding.[284]

Large-scale returns will add pressure on livelihoods and services.[285] Pakistan accelerated expulsions of undocumented Afghans from July 2026, increasing deportation risks.[286] Border insecurity is expected to persist, causing further displacement and disrupting economic and humanitarian activity.[287] Humanitarian access constraints will remain high, amid restrictions on women and girls and cross-border tensions.[288]

According to the latest IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis, during November 2026–April 2027, 19.2 million people (38 percent of the population analysed) are expected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity, including 5.1 million facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4). This projection points to a worsening of the food security situation compared with the corresponding periods in 2024–2025 and 2025–2026. The nutrition outlook is similarly concerning, with 4 million cases of acute malnutrition expected among children aged 6–59 months during January–December 2027, including 1.1 million severe cases of acute malnutrition. In addition, 1.3 million pregnant and breastfeeding women are expected to experience acute malnutrition during the same period.[289] Economic pressures, large-scale returns and reduced assistance could drive further deterioration of the malnutrition situation during the outlook period.[290]


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RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory action

- Strengthen monitoring of rainfall, snowfall and snowmelt, ensure winter prepositioning in areas at risk of isolation and advance preparedness for localized spring floods, erosion and landslides.
- Provide targeted livestock feed and animal-health support to vulnerable livestock-owning households during winter, particularly in areas affected by successive years of drought and poor rangeland conditions.
- Protect irrigation infrastructure, agricultural land and other productive assets through priority flood- and erosion-mitigation measures, ahead of the spring snowmelt and rainfall period.
- Preposition relief supplies, scale up early-warning messaging and implement no-regret preparedness measures, ahead of the anticipated early spring flood season.

Emergency response

The Afghanistan 2026 HNRP calls for USD 651 million to support food security and agriculture interventions and USD 298 million for nutrition.[291]

- Scale up targeted emergency food assistance for populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), particularly returnees, IDPs, female-headed households and other vulnerable groups.
- Ensure timely access to seed, fertilizer, livestock feed and animal-health support before key planting and winter/spring livestock stress periods, to protect productive assets and capitalize on favourable agricultural conditions.
- Scale up monitoring, prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition, integrated with the food security, health and WASH package of services – particularly in provinces with the highest global acute malnutrition prevalence.

Other actions

- Reinforce preparedness in high-return and displacement-affected areas, to mitigate growing pressure on livelihoods and essential services amid continued cross-border returns, potential further displacement and border volatility.
- Maintain operational readiness for flood response through pre-established agreements, coordination mechanisms, rapid assessment capacities and response systems, to enable timely assistance to affected populations.



Asia and the Pacific

Myanmar

HOTSPOT

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, economic challenges

High levels of acute food insecurity nationwide are projected to persist during the outlook, primarily due to escalating conflicts, displacement, humanitarian access restrictions, erosion of livelihoods and monsoon flooding. Market disruptions and economic fragility, compounded by spillover effects from the Middle East crisis, are eroding purchasing power and exerting additional pressure on agricultural production.

Conflict is expected to remain the main driver of acute food insecurity, with limited access to agricultural fields, trade barriers, movement restrictions and market fragmentation; this is likely to continue constraining food access and income-generating opportunities during the outlook period.[292, 293] As of the end of August 2026, more than 4 million people were internally displaced and over 388 000 people had fled the country.[294, 295] During the outlook period, fighting is expected to remain intense in western Myanmar and expand towards central areas.[296] This will take a severe toll on civilians, amid continued displacement and increasing conflict-related humanitarian access restrictions, particularly in Sagaing, Rakhine and Magway.[297, 298] Humanitarian funding shortfalls could further constrain the scale and coverage of assistance at a time of rising needs – increasing the risk of households resorting to negative coping strategies and further deterioration in food security outcomes.[299]

Fragile economic conditions, compounded by the Middle East crisis, are resulting in price shocks due to Myanmar's heavy fuel and fertilizer import dependency and limited reserves. Sustained increases in fuel and fertilizer costs are likely to raise transportation and production costs. This will constrain food production and place additional pressure on food prices and household purchasing power in conflict-affected and market-dependent areas.[300, 301, 302] These macroeconomic pressures are exacerbated by rapid currency depreciation, severely restricting agricultural land access and local market functionality. As of August 2026, the cost of the national food basket had increased to 25 percent above pre-crisis levels,[303] as fuel prices remained 50 percent above pre-crisis levels.[304]

National crop production is expected to slightly exceed the five-year average in 2026.[305] However, heavy monsoon rainfall and localized flooding in July and August 2026 caused significant damage, especially in northwestern and southeastern Myanmar and Rakhine State, inundating extensive areas of crops and farmland and damaging critical infrastructure.[306] In conflict-affected areas, displacement, market disruptions, high agricultural input prices,[307] seasonal flooding risks and limited access to livelihood opportunities could further lower production prospects.[308]

Around 12.3 million people (22 percent of the population analysed) are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (equivalent to IPC Phase 3 or above) during the June–August 2027 lean season. This includes 1.36 million people in Emergency (equivalent to IPC Phase 4). Malnutrition is projected to worsen between November 2026 and May 2027, reaching extremely critical levels in Buthidaung (equivalent to IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 5) and critical levels in Maungdaw (equivalent to IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 4), due to conflict-related displacement, limited service access, and recurrent disease outbreaks.[309]


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RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Myanmar 2026 HNRP calls for USD 183.9 million to support food security interventions and USD 55 million for nutrition.[310]

- Scale up and sustain life-saving food assistance, prioritizing IDPs, non-displaced stateless populations and households facing severe food consumption gaps.
- Protect and restore food production capacity through the timely provision of emergency agricultural, livestock and fisheries/aquaculture support – in areas where access and security conditions permit – prioritizing displaced populations, non-displaced stateless populations and the most vulnerable conflict-affected households.
- Scale up integrated nutrition interventions in conflict and displacement hotspots, prioritizing the treatment of severe acute malnutrition and moderate acute malnutrition among children and pregnant and breastfeeding women.

Other actions

- Preposition food and nutrition supplies and strengthen emergency preparedness, to sustain assistance delivery amid conflict, access constraints and climate-related shocks.
- Strengthen operational monitoring and adaptive response mechanisms, to rapidly adjust assistance modalities, targeting and delivery approaches in response to evolving conflict, displacement and market conditions.



Eastern Africa

Somalia

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, flooding, high food prices and the extended effects of previous droughts

Acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate during the outlook period, driven by El Niño-related flooding, conflict, high food prices and fuel costs, the effects of previous droughts, and pre-existing vulnerability due to persistently high levels of acute food insecurity and malnutrition, compounded by declining humanitarian assistance.[311] This comes amid large-scale displacement, with an estimated 3.3 million people internally displaced as of September 2026.[312] IDPs in Baidoa remain classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) through December 2026, although the previously identified risk of Famine is no longer expected.[313, 314]

Northwestern *Gu/Karan* production was estimated at 76 percent below its long-term average, while Southern Somalia's 2026 *Gu* cereal production was estimated at 32 percent above its long-term average.[315] During the outlook period, ongoing El Niño conditions are expected to result in well-above-average October–December 2026 *Deyr* rains – potentially benefiting crop yields outside flood-affected areas – with harvest expected from January 2027.[316] Some areas along the Juba and Shabelle rivers are expected to face the highest flood risks. An estimated 3.4 million people could be exposed to flood risks during the period from October to December 2026, especially in Hiiraan, Middle Juba and Lower Juba regions,[317] with widespread livelihood losses, disrupted humanitarian access and worsening food insecurity.[318] With forecasts indicating that El Niño conditions may persist into 2027, flooding and damage to river embankments and irrigation canals could delay land preparation and planting for the 2027 *Gu* season.[319] Looking into 2027, improved *Deyr* rainfall could support pasture and water availability and agricultural and livestock production across pastoral and agropastoral areas. However, these seasonal gains are unlikely to be uniform.

Flooding is expected to affect IDP settlements in flood-prone areas, including Baidoa, Beletweyne and Qardho.[320] At the same time, localized conflict and insecurity are likely to continue restricting population movements, trade flows, agricultural activities and humanitarian access in affected areas. Conflict and insecurity in Bay, Middle Shabelle and Hiiraan are disrupting key supply routes and markets, and raising food and transport costs, while operational constraints and funding shortfalls affecting the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) could further exacerbate insecurity.[321, 322] These overlapping security and access constraints are likely to further disrupt humanitarian assistance and livelihood support, increasing households' vulnerability to further deterioration in acute food insecurity.[323] These pressures are compounded by elevated food and fuel prices.[324]

These overlapping shocks continue to erode livelihoods and coping capacities, increasing dependence on humanitarian assistance and negative coping strategies.[325] During October–December 2026, 5.3 million people (27 percent of the population analysed) are expected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), including nearly 1.5 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).[326] Acute food insecurity remains particularly concerning across northern Somalia, including Somaliland, with the most critical levels projected among pastoral and displaced populations in Bari and Nugaal through the end of 2026.[327] In Baidoa, around 26 000 IDPs were previously projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), and a risk of Famine was identified under a plausible worst-case scenario of severe flooding and further displacement. While the latest IPC update indicates that no population is now projected to face Catastrophe and that the risk of Famine is no longer expected through December 2026, IDPs in Baidoa continue to face extreme levels of acute food insecurity and malnutrition.[328]

Acute malnutrition is projected to deteriorate during the outlook period; 22 out of the 48 areas analysed are projected to face Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) levels of acute malnutrition, with IDPs in Beletweyne classified in IPC AMN Phase 5 (Extremely Critical). Between July 2026 and June 2027, 1.92 million children aged 6–59 months and 155 000 pregnant and breastfeeding women were expected to be acutely malnourished, including 437 000 children affected by severe acute malnutrition.[329]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory action

- Provide multipurpose cash transfers to vulnerable households, to stabilize household purchasing power, improve access to food and address their essential needs ahead of the forecast floods.
- Disburse anticipatory/pre-emptive cash assistance to at-risk rural households, to mitigate the impact of forecast floods.
- Disseminate early-warning information and advisories to communities, ahead of forecast risks and hazards such as floods.
- Strengthen animal health services – including surveillance, vaccination and voucher-based treatments – alongside supplementary feed, and support livestock asset protection and movement, enabling vulnerable pastoral and agropastoral households to relocate animals from high-risk flood zones.

Emergency response

The Somalia 2026 HNRP calls for USD 301 million for food security and livelihoods interventions and USD 75 million for nutrition.[330]

- Provide emergency livestock support and climate-sensitive agricultural interventions, coupled with cash+, to protect productive assets, sustain food production and prevent further deterioration in food security.
- Strengthen integrated nutrition and health services, including disease surveillance, to mitigate the compounding impacts of disease outbreaks, malnutrition and food insecurity on vulnerable populations.
- Scale up life-saving prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition for children under 5 years of age and pregnant and breastfeeding women, prioritizing districts with the highest acute malnutrition burden and areas affected by displacement, poor access to services and recurrent climate shocks.
- Provide life-saving food assistance, through emergency unconditional cash, voucher transfers and in-kind rations, to ensure immediate access to food, prioritizing populations experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity.
- Support flood-recession agriculture through timely provision of short-cycle seeds, tools and technical assistance, to enable vulnerable households to rapidly restore food production as floodwater recedes.
- Support government-led preparedness, early warning and response coordination, including the Somali Disaster Management Agency (SoDMA) and Federal Member State disaster management agencies, in line with the Somalia National Anticipatory Action Roadmap.

Other actions

- Rehabilitate critical water infrastructure through cash-for-work schemes, while providing short-term income.


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Eastern Africa

South Sudan

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, dry conditions, high food prices

Acute food insecurity is expected to remain extremely severe during the outlook period, driven by extreme climate shocks, conflict and extreme access constraints, compounded by macroeconomic challenges. The latest available IPC analysis identified a risk of Famine in four counties of Jonglei and Upper Nile states under a worst-case scenario through July 2026.[331]

Persistent conflict, particularly in Jonglei and Upper Nile, continues to displace populations, disrupt livelihoods and markets and constrain access to productive assets and basic services.[332] As of October 2026, 2.5 million people remained internally displaced, including 484 000 newly displaced since January 2026.[333] In addition, nearly 1.4 million Sudanese refugees and South Sudanese refugee returnees had arrived from the Sudan since April 2023.[334] Humanitarian access restrictions remain extreme,[335] while attacks along key supply routes drive high food prices and erode purchasing power. Rising political tensions ahead of the December 2026 elections may further increase the risk of localized violence and displacement.[336]

These pressures are compounded by challenging macroeconomic conditions, with a weak South Sudanese pound and high food prices due to import reliance and the impact of the Middle East conflict.[337, 338, 339] In Juba, diesel prices more than doubled between February and August 2026, pushing up food and transport costs.[340]

El Niño-related rainfall deficits during the June–September season and above-average temperatures have already weakened crop prospects across much of the country, with dry conditions affecting Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity, Warrap, Bahr el Ghazal and Eastern Equatoria; below-average production is expected in these locations.[341, 342, 343, 344] In southern areas, forecast above-average rainfall between October and December could support second-season crop development, while increasing localized flood risk, particularly in the southeast.[345, 346, 347] In drought- and conflict-affected areas, reduced harvests are expected to constrain food availability in early 2027, as household stocks are depleted earlier than usual, potentially bringing forward the onset of the lean season.[348, 349]

From April to July 2026, 7.8 million people (55 percent of the population analysed) were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 2.5 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 73 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). The highest prevalence of acute food insecurity requiring urgent assistance was reported in the conflict-affected states of Unity, Jonglei and Upper Nile, ranging from 64 to 66 percent. Populations in Luakpiny/Nasir, Ulang, Akobo and Nyirol counties were assessed to face a credible risk of Famine under a worst-case scenario of intensifying conflict and flooding, amid restricted humanitarian access through July 2026.[350] The nutrition situation continues to deteriorate, with ten counties classified in IPC AMN Phase 5 (Extremely Critical), with new hotspots such as Guit County (GAM: 36 percent).[351] An estimated 2.2 million children aged 6–59 months and 1.2 million pregnant and breastfeeding women were projected to be acutely malnourished through June 2026, including 697 000 children with severe acute malnutrition.[352] The combination of extreme access constraints and severe funding shortfalls risks leaving significant gaps in critical food security and nutrition responses.[353, 354, 355]



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RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory action

- Disseminate tailored early warnings and advisories to communities ahead of forecast floods, to enable protective actions that safeguard lives and livelihoods. Distribute flood-proof storage systems to protect essential household items and agricultural assets.
- Provide livestock vaccination and prophylactic treatments to prevent flood-related livestock diseases – particularly anthrax, which poses risks to both animals and humans.

Emergency response

The South Sudan 2026 HNRP calls for USD 410.6 million for food security and USD 128 million for nutrition interventions.[356]

- Scale up and sustain life-saving food assistance in areas facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), prioritizing populations in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), areas at risk of Famine, drought-affected areas, newly displaced households, IDPs, returnees and refugees from the Sudan, and highly vulnerable host communities in conflict-affected and hard-to-reach areas of Jonglei and Upper Nile.
- Expand integrated nutrition interventions to prevent excess morbidity and mortality among children under 5 years of age and pregnant and breastfeeding women in high-burden, conflict-affected and hard-to-reach areas. Scale up community-based screening, early detection and treatment of acute malnutrition and preventive nutrition support, while strengthening integration with food security and health services.
- Strengthen agricultural, livestock and fisheries-based livelihoods in conflict-, displacement- and climate-affected areas through the timely provision of climate-adapted crop and vegetable seeds, fishing inputs, animal health services and livelihood support. Prioritize households affected by poor rainfall and below-average production, while anticipating increased flood and waterlogging risks and protecting productive assets and local food production ahead of 2027.


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Eastern Africa

Uganda

HOTSPOT

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: dry conditions, high food prices

Acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate in the agropastoral Karamoja region of northeastern Uganda and for refugee populations during the outlook period. Poor harvests and high food prices are likely to constrain food availability and access, compounded by reduced humanitarian assistance and the wider effects of the Middle East crisis on regional food and fuel prices.[357]

The April–September 2026 rainy season was erratic, with persistent rainfall deficits from June to September.[358] These prolonged moisture deficits, associated with the ongoing El Niño event, have adversely affected crop performance, pasture conditions and water availability across Karamoja.[359] Deteriorating livestock body conditions have led to lower livestock prices and reduced household income from livestock sales.[360]

As a result of the poor harvest, household food stocks are expected to remain low even during the harvest season, when they would normally peak. Consequently, households are expected to rely heavily on markets for food, despite staple prices remaining 15–25 percent above year-earlier levels in September 2026.[361]

Above-average October–December rainfall may improve water and pasture availability and support livestock recovery, though crop benefits remain uncertain; localized flooding is possible.[362, 363, 364] However, these benefits are expected to only partially offset main season crop losses and the effects of prolonged dry conditions on livestock.[365]

In Karamoja alone, during November 2026–February 2027, around 679 000 people (43 percent of the population analysed) are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 110 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), amid poor harvests, high food prices and reduced humanitarian assistance. Also among the most vulnerable population groups, 731 000 refugees (36 percent of the refugee population) are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) during February–June 2027, of whom 93 000 are projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4).[366] Acute malnutrition is projected to affect nearly 466 000 children under 5 years of age across Uganda through March 2027, including over 154 000 in Karamoja, and to deteriorate during the outlook period, with Kotido and Kaabong classified in IPC AMN Phase 4 (Critical) and Amudat, Moroto, Nabilatuk and Nakapiripirit in IPC AMN Phase 3 (Serious).[367]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory action

- Disseminate tailored early warnings and advisories ahead of flooding.
- Clear debris from around critical infrastructure and deliver anticipatory cash assistance to protect flood-prone riverine communities.
- Protect livestock assets and pastoral livelihoods through vaccination, treatment, disease surveillance, fodder support and access to strategic water points ahead of flooding.

Emergency response

The 2026 United Nations and Partners Appeal for Karamoja calls for USD 21 million for food security and USD 9 million for nutrition interventions in 2026.[368]

- Scale up and sustain targeted food and cash assistance, prioritizing households with the largest food consumption gaps, especially in Kotido, Kaabong, Karenga and Nabilatuk, including vulnerable IDPs and returnees.
- Restore crop production through the provision of seeds and tools, supported by extension services.
- Scale up treatment and prevention of acute malnutrition and improve child and maternal diets through screening, referrals, therapeutic and supplementary feeding and counselling on dietary diversity, meal frequency and breastfeeding practices, prioritizing Kaabong and Kotido.

Other actions

- Integrate food security, nutrition and health responses and strengthen prevention and case management of malaria, diarrhoea, measles and other childhood illnesses that compound malnutrition, particularly in Kaabong, Kotido, Amudat, Moroto, Nabilatuk and Nakapiripirit.

Latin America and the Caribbean

Haiti

HOTSPOT OF VERY HIGH CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: gang violence, economic crisis, below-average agricultural production, below-average rainfall

Record levels of acute food insecurity are likely to persist during the outlook period. Expanding gang violence beyond the capital is expected to continue driving displacement and constraining humanitarian access. A protracted economic crisis and below-average rainfall linked to El Niño between December 2026 and March 2027, compounded by significant funding gaps, are likely to further limit food access and availability.

Amid increasing operations by the UN-backed Gang Suppression Force – planned to reach full capacity during the outlook period – gangs are expanding beyond the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area into Artibonite, Centre, Ouest and South-East departments. Rural attacks disrupt agricultural supply chains and force people to flee,[369, 370] including from farming areas of Artibonite and Kenscoff.[371] The number of IDPs reached a record 1.5 million as of August 2026, with nearly 80 percent hosted outside the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.[372] Armed violence is expected to persist and intensify during the outlook period, amid uncertainty over the electoral timetable following the postponement of the campaign and pending publication of an updated calendar.[373, 374] Humanitarian access constraints are likely to remain very high.[375]

The economy has contracted for the eighth consecutive year, with gang violence further depressing investment and income-generating activities since 2021.[376] Increasing forced returns are likely to reduce remittances that are key for vulnerable households.[377, 378] Annual headline inflation eased to 17 percent in August 2026, with food prices 19 percent higher than a year earlier.[379] With the Middle East conflict constraining oil flows into early 2027,[380] fuel prices have risen sharply and are likely to stay high,[381] raising transport and food costs.[382]

Since late April 2026, erratic rainfall has disrupted planting and crop development, while land abandonment and high input costs have reduced cultivated areas, limiting the June–August 2026 spring (printemps) harvest.[383] Due to El Niño, erratic rainfall, persistent soil moisture deficits and above-average temperatures are expected to constrain fall and winter crops, particularly in southern Haiti. Although rainfall may increase in early 2027, uncertainty remains over whether this will sufficiently improve conditions ahead of spring.[384]

The latest IPC analysis projected 6.4 million people (57 percent of the population analysed) to be in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in March–June 2027 – the highest number since IPC analyses began in Haiti in 2013 – including 2 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).[385]



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RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory action

- Provide early-warning messages with tailored advice, as well as anticipatory cash transfers, to protect lives and enable households to mitigate crop losses ahead of forecast dry conditions.
- Ahead of forecast below-average rainfall, distribute nutrient-rich animal feed to vulnerable livestock keepers and provide preventive animal health treatments to protect livestock health and productivity.
- Distribute agricultural inputs and tools and provide technical assistance to cultivate short-cycle crop varieties ahead of the second maize and bean cropping season.

Emergency response

The Haiti 2026 HNRP calls for USD 423.5 million for food security interventions and USD 40.7 million for nutrition.[386]

- Scale up life-saving food and nutrition assistance for populations facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4), including IDPs, women, children and other vulnerable groups, particularly in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, Lower Artibonite, Centre and Nord-Ouest.
- Implement cash transfer programmes to enable households to purchase food and agricultural inputs, prioritizing families severely affected by inflation, restricted access to markets and insecurity.
- Implement emergency agricultural programmes through the timely provision of short-cycle seeds, tools and small livestock, alongside livestock vaccination, enabling rapid food production at household level for household consumption and sale in local markets.
- Scale up acute malnutrition prevention and treatment in areas with increasing malnutrition prevalence, reinforcing integration with food security, WASH and health partners.

Other actions

- Ensure access to livelihood and humanitarian assistance for all affected populations, including those in hard-to-reach areas affected by insecurity.
- Strengthen early-warning, market and displacement monitoring systems, to support timely targeting and adaptive responses in areas affected by insecurity, population movements, climatic shocks and deterioration in food access conditions.

Central American Dry Corridor

HOTSPOT

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: dry conditions and economic pressures

Acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate across parts of the Central American Dry Corridor during the outlook period.[387] **El Niño-related rainfall deficits have already reduced crop production, leaving households with lower food stocks and weaker agricultural incomes. These losses are being compounded by high food, fuel and agricultural input costs.**[388, 389, 390, 391]

The 2026 *Primera* season ranks as the driest in four decades.[392] Between April and August, many of the western areas of the region received only 30–60 percent of average rainfall, with crop losses exceeding 75 percent. High temperatures accelerated soil-moisture losses, while delayed and erratic rains affected *Primera* crops and the start of the *Postrera* season.[393, 394] As El Niño strengthens, below-average and erratic rainfall is expected through the end of the 2026 rainy season, increasing the risk of further crop losses and below-average crop production.[395, 396] Funding and targeted assistance are needed to prevent worsening food insecurity across the region.[397, 398]

The effects of poor 2026 harvests are expected to persist into the outlook period, limiting household food stocks and seasonal income. By June 2026, households in parts of the Central American Dry Corridor were already reporting very low reserves, with 57 percent having exhausted maize stocks and 34 percent having exhausted bean stocks.[399] High food and fuel prices, with white maize prices around 20 percent higher in July 2026 in Honduras compared with their level one year earlier, together with elevated agricultural input and transport costs, are compounding these production losses, further increasing the most vulnerable households' dependence on markets and reducing their purchasing power.[400, 401, 402, 403] Food stocks may be depleted earlier than usual, bringing forward

the 2027 lean season and prolonging market dependence. Repeated weather-related production losses have left some Dry Corridor communities particularly exposed to further deterioration as the 2027 lean season approaches.[404, 405, 406]

Available evidence indicates substantial levels of acute food insecurity. The tri-national Río Lempa IPC analysis highlights significant needs across four micro-regions located within the Dry Corridor, with 183 000 people (26 percent of the population analysed) facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) during November 2026–March 2027.[407] In Guatemala, around 3.2 million people (18 percent of the population analysed) are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) during October 2026–February 2027, including around 176 000 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).[408] In Honduras, nearly 1.9 million people (18 percent) were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) during August–October 2026 country-wide, including around 105 000 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).[409] Beyond these figures, acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate across the Dry Corridor as poor households exhaust stocks from below-average 2026 harvests, bringing forward the 2027 lean season.[410]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory action

- Protect food production, productive assets and access to food, through the distribution of seeds and fertilizers, water harvesting, anticipatory cash transfers and the promotion of good agricultural practices.
- Protect access to safe water and support hygiene practices, including in health facilities and schools, by protecting and rehabilitating water sources, distributing water storage supplies and water treatment chemicals and raising awareness of water and hygiene management.

Emergency response

The 2026 Honduras flash appeal for drought calls for USD 30.7 million for food security and nutrition interventions.[411]

- Mitigate the risk of acute malnutrition among children under 5 years of age by strengthening surveillance, prepositioning supplies and mobilizing communities to enable early identification, referral and access to life-saving treatment.
- Scale up emergency food assistance to vulnerable households facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), particularly in drought-affected areas of Honduras and western Guatemala.
- Provide drought-tolerant seeds, fertilizers and other essential production inputs to vulnerable smallholder farmers, to restore food production and agricultural incomes.
- Expand cash-for-work and other income-generating livelihood support in affected areas of Honduras and western Guatemala, to compensate for reduced agricultural labour and income opportunities caused by successive weather-related production losses.
- Provide livestock feed, veterinary services and water-access support to vulnerable livestock-owning households in drought-affected areas.


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Near East and North Africa

Sudan

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict and insecurity, economic crisis, El Niño-induced drought conditions

Acute food insecurity is expected to remain extreme, with populations projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and a risk of Famine persisting in 13 areas and IDP settlements through January 2027, under a reasonable worst-case scenario. There are growing signs of catastrophic deterioration,[412] as conflict and cereal production shortfalls constrain food availability and access, and sustain exceptionally high food prices.[413, 414]

Conflict is projected to remain the main driver of acute food insecurity, sustaining displacement and disrupting livelihoods, markets and agricultural activities, especially in Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan and Blue Nile state.[415, 416] Siege-like conditions and recurrent drone strikes in El Obeid have worsened the humanitarian situation in North Kordofan.[417, 418] About 8.6 million people were internally displaced as of October 2026,[419] and large numbers of Sudanese refugees remain in neighbouring countries, while new outflows continue alongside increased returns.[420] Extreme humanitarian access constraints and funding shortfalls will further limit food and emergency agricultural assistance.[421, 422]

Below-average June–September rainfall associated with El Niño affected crop germination and establishment, while above-average temperatures further compounded moisture stress.[423] In the key cropping states of Sennar and Gedaref, severe drought conditions at the end of the rainy season affected up to 55 and 70 percent of cropland, respectively.[424] The situation is particularly concerning in the Darfur states and North Kordofan, where acute food insecurity is already at critical levels. Below-average rainfall, delayed planting and deteriorating pasture and water conditions are expected to further constrain crop and livestock production.[425, 426, 427] Cereal production shortfalls and exceptionally high staple food prices – driven by conflict and higher fuel costs linked to the Middle East conflict – are expected to continue constraining food access in late 2026 and early 2027.[428]

The latest nationwide IPC analysis estimated that nearly 19.5 million people (41 percent of the population) faced Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) from February to May 2026, including more than 5 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and nearly 135 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). The June–September 2026 and October 2026–January 2027 projections are limited in geographical coverage and are therefore not directly comparable with the nationwide analysis.

During the June–September 2026 lean season, nearly 5.6 million people (67 percent of the population analysed) were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 2.2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 200 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). A risk of Famine was identified in 14 areas across North Darfur, South Darfur and South Kordofan under a reasonable worst-case scenario, characterized by intensified conflict and further restrictions on humanitarian access and the movement of goods and people.

For October 2026–January 2027, coinciding with the harvest period, around 4.9 million people (59 percent of the population analysed) are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including over 1.7 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and over 71 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). During this period, a risk of Famine has been identified in 13 areas and IDP settlements across North Darfur and South Kordofan.[429]

An estimated 4.2 million children and pregnant and breastfeeding women are expected to be acutely malnourished in 2026, particularly in Darfur and Kordofan.[430] A September Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions survey in Eastern Jebel Marra, South Darfur, identified global acute malnutrition prevalence exceeding the acute malnutrition threshold for Famine in two IDP camps, at 38 percent and 30.8 percent, respectively, measured by weight-for-height z-score. Alarmingly, these findings coincide with severe hunger and elevated mortality levels.[431] Acute food insecurity is likely to increase towards the end of the outlook period and beyond, as the lean season begins.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Sudan 2026 HNRP calls for USD 1.5 billion for food security and livelihoods interventions and USD 471.7 million for nutrition interventions.[432]

- Scale up life-saving food assistance for populations facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), and in locations at risk of Famine, in North Darfur, South Darfur and South Kordofan. Provide in-kind food or, where markets function, cash or vouchers, using rapid delivery mechanisms for besieged, displaced and hard-to-reach populations.
- Deliver time-critical agricultural, livestock and fisheries support through flexible modalities, including seeds, tools, veterinary services, feed and fodder, to protect productive assets, sustain local food availability and restore livelihoods among conflict- and displacement-affected households during the dry season.
- Sustain integrated emergency nutrition services in areas with critical or extremely critical acute malnutrition, expanding screening, treatment, preventive support and micronutrient interventions for children and pregnant and breastfeeding women, while protecting therapeutic food supply chains and community-based delivery.



Near East and North Africa

Yemen

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, economic shocks

Acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate further during the outlook period, largely driven by escalating, large-scale conflict on multiple fronts, compounded by the adverse economic impact of the regional crisis, El Niño-related floods, humanitarian funding shortfalls and extreme access constraints in parts of Yemen.[433]

Violence resurged in July 2026[434] and intensified along the western coast in September, affecting the entire Taiz governorate. Together with recent airstrikes in DFA-controlled areas and heightened regional tensions, this escalation is expected to worsen already critical levels of acute food insecurity. In Taiz city and surrounding areas, current encirclements are creating siege-like conditions, with civilians facing severe supply disruptions. Many of the newly displaced households are unable to meet their food needs and are exhausting their coping capacity despite receiving humanitarian assistance.[435] Humanitarian access to the west coast has also deteriorated amid temporary movement restrictions and operational suspensions, among other factors.[436] The escalation is likely to further drive internal displacement and refugee outflows to Djibouti and Somalia,[437, 438] disrupt trade and import flows and further constrain humanitarian access. By the end of October, more than 300 000 people had been internally displaced since the start of the escalation,[439] primarily in Taiz, Lahj and Aden governorates – further exacerbating the needs of around 3.1 million people already displaced across GoY-controlled areas. Newly displaced people are arriving at sites where conditions are already severe, placing additional pressure on fragile services.[440, 441, 442]

For an import-dependent economy such as Yemen, maritime escalation threatens a critical lifeline: Red Sea shipping. Disruptions risk constraining essential food supplies, while raising transport and import costs and adding pressure on food prices.[443] These pressures compound weak purchasing power, while oil export disruptions constrain revenues and foreign exchange. Despite policy-driven currency appreciation and stability for over a year in GoY-controlled areas, the rising price of essential food commodities – including a year-on-year increase of up to 35 percent for vegetable oil – continues to erode household purchasing power and constrain food affordability and accessibility;[444] more than 70 percent of households are already facing income decreases.[445] Climate conditions, including El Niño as a risk multiplier, are expected to compound these pressures during the outlook, with localized flooding and persistent above-average temperatures likely to continue disrupting livelihoods and agricultural activities into early 2027. Additional risks include cyclone-related flooding in Socotra and along Yemen's southern coast bordering the Gulf of Aden.[446, 447, 448]

Between October and December 2026, 5.4 million people (51 percent of the population analysed) in GoY-controlled areas are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above).[449] This includes 1.8 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4),[450] compared with 1.6 million during the September 2025–February 2026 projection period.[451]

While no recent food security analysis is available for DFA-controlled areas, the latest available nationwide projection indicated that 18.3 million people would face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) through February 2026 (representing 52 percent of the population); this included 5.5 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and more than 41 000 people projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).[452, 453, 454, 455] In light of the recent conflict escalation and worsening humanitarian access, food security is likely to deteriorate as frontlines shift in southwestern areas and displacement increases.[456]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Yemen 2026 HNRP calls for USD 900 million for food security and livelihoods interventions and USD 177.2 million for nutrition.[457]

- Scale up nutrition-sensitive humanitarian food assistance, prioritizing populations facing severe acute food insecurity, to meet immediate food needs and reduce food consumption gaps.
- Provide emergency agricultural, livestock and fisheries support, alongside income-generating activities, to safeguard productive assets, support household food access and strengthen resilience.
- Scale up integrated nutrition interventions to prevent and treat acute malnutrition among children under 5 years of age and pregnant and breastfeeding women, including supplementary feeding, therapeutic treatment, micronutrient interventions and community-based nutrition services in high-burden districts.

Near East and North Africa

Palestine

HOTSPOT OF VERY HIGH CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, economic collapse

Acute food insecurity is expected to remain severe in the Gaza Strip, due to continued hostilities, extensive damage to agrifood systems and disruption of local food production. It is expected to deteriorate further in the West Bank during the outlook period, driven by insecurity, reduced humanitarian assistance, livelihood losses and constrained purchasing power.[458]

In the Gaza Strip, despite the October 2025 ceasefire, hostilities, continued displacement, extensive livelihood losses and restricted access to productive land are expected to keep households highly dependent on humanitarian assistance. Market functionality is expected to remain fragile, while severe income losses, high and volatile prices and supply chain disruptions continue to erode purchasing power and remaining assets.[459] Extreme humanitarian access constraints and regional insecurity could raise operational costs, increasing households' vulnerability to further deterioration in acute food insecurity. Impending funding cuts threaten to further reduce critical assistance ahead of the winter.[460, 461]

Agricultural recovery is expected to remain severely constrained. As of late June 2026, only 3 percent of cropland was accessible and undamaged, while input shortages are expected to further constrain production and agricultural livelihoods.[462] An additional 24 percent of cropland is accessible but damaged, requiring rehabilitation before cultivation can resume. Winter rains and the risk of localized flooding could worsen conditions for the nearly 2 million people estimated to need shelter and essential household items,[463] who already face severely limited access to essential services.[464]

In the West Bank, military operations, settler violence, demolitions, movement restrictions and displacement continue to disrupt livelihoods and markets.[465] About 0.9 million people were estimated to be acutely food insecure according to the 2026 Flash Appeal,[466] while funding shortfalls are reducing food assistance coverage and limiting emergency agricultural assistance.[467] With 76 percent of surveyed households having experienced a significant decline in income, economic deterioration and reduced assistance are expected to worsen acute food insecurity during the outlook period,[468, 469] particularly in rural areas and southern governorates.[470]

About 1.4 million people (67 percent of the Gaza Strip's population) are expected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity in July–December 2026, including 212 000 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).[471] This is an improvement compared with the same period in 2025. Food security started to improve after the October 2025 ceasefire. This was due to improved humanitarian access and the subsequent scale-up of aid provision. However, the projection indicates a deterioration compared with April–June 2026, underscoring the fragility of these gains. If commercial supply and humanitarian food assistance are not sustained, up to 90 percent of the population could face high levels of acute food insecurity by late 2026.[472]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

Within the 2026 Flash Appeal for the Occupied Palestinian Territory, covering the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, USD 1.3 billion is required for food security and livelihoods interventions and USD 231.6 million for nutrition interventions.[473]

Gaza Strip

- Sustain the uninterrupted provision of large-scale emergency food assistance across all five governorates of the Gaza Strip, through coordinated in-kind distributions, community kitchens, bakeries and cash-based assistance where markets remain functional, prioritizing displaced populations, female-headed households and other highly vulnerable groups.
- Enhance emergency livelihood support and short-term income opportunities linked to the rehabilitation of food and agricultural production systems, community infrastructure and displacement sites, where access and safety conditions permit, enabling highly vulnerable households to improve access to food while reducing reliance on negative coping strategies.
- Scale up integrated nutrition services across the Gaza Strip, combining nutrition screening, active case finding, prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition, infant and young child feeding support, maternal nutrition,

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

supplementary feeding, micronutrient supplementation and targeted cash assistance, to improve dietary diversity and nutrition outcomes among children, pregnant and breastfeeding women and other nutritionally vulnerable groups.

- Provide emergency agricultural assistance to support crop, livestock and poultry farmers, herders and fishers in accessing critical inputs and tools through in-kind support and/or cash assistance, while rehabilitating farms, greenhouses, orchards, fisheries and water infrastructure to restart food production and sustain agricultural livelihoods.

West Bank

- Maintain and expand targeted food assistance and food voucher support for vulnerable households affected by conflict, displacement, settler violence and movement restrictions, particularly in the northern West Bank refugee camps of Jenin, Tulkarm and Nur Shams, as well as among Bedouin and herding communities.
- Enhance emergency cash-based assistance to households experiencing livelihood losses resulting from military operations, settler attacks, demolitions and restricted access to employment and markets, helping to preserve food access and prevent the adoption of negative coping strategies.
- Strengthen support for farmers, herders and Bedouin communities in the central and northern Jordan Valley, the E1 area, the eastern slopes from Nablus to Masafer Yatta, Wadi Qana, the Seam Zone between Qalqilya and Tulkarm and southern Bethlehem and Hebron, through the provision of critical agricultural inputs, rehabilitation of agricultural water infrastructure, and protection of productive assets to sustain local food production and agricultural livelihoods.
- Expand emergency livestock support, including drought-tolerant fodder seeds, vaccines and other veterinary services, alongside assistance to improve access to water, for herding communities facing increasing restrictions on grazing land, displacement pressures and livelihood disruption.
- Increase access to essential nutrition services for children under 5 years of age, pregnant and breastfeeding women and other nutritionally vulnerable groups, through primary health-care facilities, mobile health and nutrition teams and rapid response mechanisms, while strengthening screening, referral and treatment of acute malnutrition in conflict-affected, displaced and hard-to-reach communities.



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Southern Africa

Democratic Republic of the Congo

HOTSPOT OF VERY HIGH CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, Ebola outbreak, flooding

Critical levels of acute food insecurity are expected to persist in selected provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the outlook period. Protracted conflict remains the main driver, while the Ebola outbreak and localized flooding risks, amid significant funding gaps, may further constrain food access.

Conflict continues to drive acute food insecurity in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. Since the January 2025 escalation of violence, insecurity has driven displacement – disrupting livelihoods, restricting agricultural activities and limiting access to essential services.[474, 475, 476] Humanitarian access remains restricted by insecurity and administrative constraints.[477] As of June 2026, about 6.1 million people were internally displaced and about 1.2 million Congolese were refugees in neighbouring countries.[478, 479]

The Ebola outbreak, caused by the Bundibugyo virus, has affected seven provinces, including Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu and Tshopo.[480] As of early October 2026, it had resulted in more than 4 400 deaths,[481] making it the largest outbreak recorded in the country.[482] The disease's spread into new areas is forcing border closures and reducing trade flows,[483] posing additional risks of disruptions to markets and livelihoods and restrictions on humanitarian access.

Agricultural production in 2026 is expected to remain constrained in conflict-affected areas due to insecurity and displacement, limiting food availability and agricultural income, while localized rainfall deficits have caused crop stress in some areas.[484] El Niño conditions are forecast to bring above-average rainfall between October 2026 and May 2027. Wetter conditions could support crop development in northern and central areas, but localized flooding could damage crops and infrastructure and further restrict market access.[485, 486, 487, 488]

According to the latest IPC analysis update issued in October 2026, about 30.3 million people (23 percent of the population analysed) are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between January and June 2027, including over 4.2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).[489] North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri remain the hardest-hit provinces, with the share of the population facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in these provinces projected to increase from 8 percent in January–June 2025 and 11 percent in the same period in 2026 to 13 percent in 2027.[490, 491] About 4.2 million children under 5 years of age and 1.5 million pregnant and breastfeeding women were estimated to require urgent nutrition assistance through June 2026, including 1.3 million children with severe acute malnutrition.[492] Reduced humanitarian funding is already limiting assistance in areas facing or at risk of acute food insecurity.[493, 494]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory action

- Provide conditional and unconditional cash-based transfers and in-kind assistance to newly displaced households or households at risk of displacement and those at risk of flooding.
- Distribute short-cycle seeds, farming tools and storage equipment to farmers in conflict-affected and flood-prone areas.
- Conduct awareness campaigns on flood risks and protective measures.
- Provide livestock feed and veterinary supplies in vulnerable flood-prone areas to prevent animal diseases and protect core breeding stock.

Emergency response

The Democratic Republic of the Congo 2026 HNRP calls for USD 621.9 million for food security and USD 131.1 million for nutrition interventions.[495]

- Scale up life-saving food assistance at full ration levels for populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), prioritizing those in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), particularly displaced people, returnees and vulnerable host communities affected by conflict in Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu and Tshopo.

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

- Scale up time-critical emergency agricultural and livelihood support in high-severity and shock-affected areas, through the rapid provision of short-cycle seeds, basic tools and essential livestock services, while supporting the restoration of food production following localized flooding where conditions permit.
- Expand emergency supplementary feeding and essential nutrition services for nutritionally vulnerable children and pregnant and breastfeeding women in conflict-, displacement- and disease-affected areas, alongside food assistance to prevent further deterioration in acute malnutrition.



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Southern Africa

Madagascar

HOTSPOT

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: below-average harvests, high food prices, below-average rainfall

Acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate in southern Madagascar during the outlook period, driven by the effects of consecutive below-average harvests and high food prices, while anticipated El Niño-related rainfall deficits could further constrain agricultural livelihoods.

In the Great South, 17 districts were identified as affected by drought, with severe conditions in 14.[496] Drought-related losses of 15–50 percent in maize and cassava production, coupled with below-average sweet potato harvests, have resulted in a second consecutive year of below-average production in southern Madagascar.[497] Poor households are expected to exhaust food stocks atypically early and become increasingly dependent on markets, while agricultural labour earnings are projected to remain 20–40 percent below average. Food access is expected to deteriorate further during the outlook, which coincides with the lean season, amid rising annual food inflation, despite some softening of rice prices in 2026 owing to sufficient domestic supplies.[498, 499]

A strengthening El Niño is forecast to delay the onset of rains and contribute to below-average rainfall and above-average temperatures during the main agricultural season, likely reducing agricultural labour opportunities and income during the November–March lean season and worsening food security in 2027/28.[500] Tropical cyclones during the 2026/27 season could compound El Niño-related risks by disrupting livelihoods, damaging crops and restricting market access – further worsening acute food insecurity in affected areas.

The centre of the crisis lies in the southern districts of Ampanihy Ouest, Ambovombe-Androy, Bekily, Beloha, Tsihombe, Antanimora Sud and Amboasary Atsimo. These districts are projected to face the most severe impacts of consecutive poor harvests, limited income-earning opportunities and rising food prices.[501]

In the seven most affected districts, the number of people facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) is expected to increase from around 685 000 in December 2025–January 2026 to 1.2 million people (58 percent of the population analysed) in October 2026–February 2027.[502] At the national level, around 3.7 million people (11 percent of the population) are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between October 2026 and February 2027, including 426 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) – all located in the seven most affected districts. The deterioration is occurring in a context of severe nutritional vulnerability, with more than 134 000 children aged 6–59 months estimated to require treatment for acute malnutrition across the seven districts through April 2027.[503]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory action

- Provide immediate cash transfers – coupled with malnutrition prevention and early-warning messages – to populations in drought-affected areas, to protect livelihoods and assets.
- Where feasible, increase the number of water points and improve the management of permanent water points to support market gardening, irrigated crops and community-based seed-production plots.
- Provide time-critical agricultural support through the provision of drought-tolerant and short-cycle varieties, other agricultural inputs and tools, alongside water management support and technical assistance for climate-smart and nutrition-sensitive production systems, to protect production and productive assets during the 2026/27 agricultural season.
- Protect at-risk livestock through animal health support, including vaccination and veterinary treatments to reduce drought-related mortality and morbidity.

Emergency response

The national preparedness, anticipatory action and response plan for El Niño (2026–2027) calls for USD 57.5 million for food security and livelihoods interventions and USD 21.5 million for nutrition.[504]

- Implement cash+ assistance – combining cash transfers with agricultural inputs, small livestock or fishing equipment – alongside training in climate-resilient and nutrition-sensitive practices, to

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

help vulnerable households meet basic needs, sustain production and prevent further asset depletion.

- Promote food diversification and village savings and loan associations, alongside nutrition-sensitive messaging and cooking demonstrations, prioritizing households caring for acutely malnourished children under 5 years of age, pregnant or breastfeeding women, older persons and persons with disabilities.
- Scale up prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition alongside food assistance, prioritizing children aged 6–59 months and other nutritionally vulnerable groups in the seven districts with populations facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4).
- Strengthen food security, livelihood, nutrition, market, rainfall and crop monitoring, to enable timely targeting and adjustment of assistance as conditions deteriorate during the lean season.



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Southern Africa

Southern Africa regional El Niño outlook: Eswatini, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe

HOTSPOT

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: dry conditions, reduced incomes, high food prices

Acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate across parts of Southern Africa as a strong El Niño brings drier and warmer-than-average conditions. During the outlook period, early impacts are expected through reduced agricultural labour opportunities, constrained planting and reduced water availability, while poor 2027 harvests could limit seasonal recovery and deepen food insecurity during the 2027/28 lean season.[505, 506]

The outlook period coincides with the 2026/27 rainy and cropping season, with rainfall typically occurring from October to April, making rainfall amounts and distribution critical to agricultural production and associated food security outcomes.[507] Below-average rainfall is expected across large parts of the region, with particular concern for Zimbabwe, southern and western Zambia, southern Malawi, central and southern Mozambique and Eswatini.[508] Above-average temperatures could further increase crop water stress and reduce yields.[509] Early in the season, below-average and erratic rainfall could delay planting and reduce cultivated area and labour opportunities, while constraining pasture development and water availability for households, crops and livestock. Reduced inflows into the Kariba reservoir could also constrain hydropower generation and economic activity in Zambia and Zimbabwe.[510] If rainfall deficits persist through key crop-development stages, poorer harvests from April 2027 could further limit household food availability and the replenishment of stocks.[511]

Across parts of Southern Africa, declining household stocks and limited income and agricultural labour opportunities are already limiting access to food, while staple prices remain elevated in some deficit-producing and import-dependent areas.[512] These pre-existing vulnerabilities could amplify the impacts of El Niño-related production losses on household food access, as rural incomes decline and market dependence increases. Higher food prices would particularly affect vulnerable households, including farmers with limited market surplus.[513, 514, 515, 516, 517] While impacts may extend across Southern Africa, concerns are particularly high in Eswatini, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe, where existing production and livelihood constraints increase vulnerability to another poor agricultural season.[518, 519]


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As the lean season progresses, from October 2026 to March 2027, reduced agricultural income and rising market dependence could deepen constraints on food access, while potential 2027 crop losses could limit subsequent seasonal recovery. In Eswatini, 286 000 people (23 percent of the population analysed) are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) during October 2026–March 2027, including 22 000 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).[520] In Malawi, around 2.6 million people (14 percent) are projected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) during October 2026–March 2027.[521]

In Zimbabwe, up to 3 million people are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity by March 2027, according to FEWS NET.[522] In Zambia, around 1.3 million people (7 percent of the population analysed) will likely face high levels of acute food insecurity during October 2026–March 2027.[523] In Mozambique, 1.8 million people (22 percent of the population analysed) are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 254 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) during this period.[524]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory action

- Provide critical agricultural inputs, including drought-tolerant seeds, short-cycle cereal seeds, legume and vegetable seeds, and fertilizers.
- Distribute supplementary livestock feed and strengthen livestock vaccination and treatment campaigns to sustain and improve livestock health and productivity, while improving access to water.
- Provide water harvesting, small-scale irrigation and water management support in drought-prone areas, to mitigate declining water availability and crop water stress.

Emergency response

- Provide emergency food and/or cash assistance in drought-affected areas of southern Malawi, Zimbabwe, Western and Southern provinces and parts of Lusaka and Eastern provinces of Zambia, and parts of Mozambique and Eswatini, where El Niño-related rainfall deficits, reduced agricultural labour opportunities and weakened purchasing power are expected to constrain household incomes and access to food.
- Expand acute malnutrition prevention and treatment alongside emergency food assistance in the most food-insecure areas, where deteriorating food access during the lean season and potential production losses heighten nutritional risks among vulnerable households.
- Scale up livelihood and income support for vulnerable rural households to offset declining agricultural labour opportunities and income losses associated with rainfall deficits and reduced crop production.
- Strengthen post-harvest and household food storage support to minimize losses and preserve available food stocks in areas where poor 2027 harvest prospects could further constrain household food availability.


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West Africa and the Sahel

Nigeria: northern regions

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, insecurity, economic pressures

Acute food insecurity is expected to remain at high levels across northern Nigeria during the outlook period, as persistent conflict, insecurity, displacement and elevated food prices continue to constrain livelihoods, agricultural production and household food access.

Conflict is expected to remain the major driver of acute food insecurity in the North East, while armed banditry and farmer–herder conflicts continue to affect the North West and North Central zones.[525, 526] Persistent violence and movement restrictions are likely to continue triggering displacement, adding to the more than 3.7 million people already internally displaced amid very high humanitarian access constraints.[527, 528] Additionally, violence is likely to continue disrupting livelihoods and severely constraining agricultural production by limiting access to land, pasture and water points.

Insecurity along trade corridors is expected to affect food supplies in local markets, which, together with continued global market uncertainty and a weak naira, is expected to keep food and fuel prices at high levels. Low incomes are likely to further erode household purchasing power, particularly among poor and market-dependent households,[529] limiting their ability to meet their food needs.[530]

Main-season production in 2026 is expected to remain below the previous year's level and the five-year average in the most conflict-affected areas of the North West and North Central, and well below average in inaccessible parts of the North East.[531] In particular, attacks, levies and insecurity caused by non-state armed groups have severely disrupted farming in key producing areas of Benue, Borno, Kaduna, Katsina, Niger, Plateau, Sokoto and Zamfara states. Nationwide, high fuel and fertilizer prices are expected to constrain production, while dry spells and rainfall deficits in parts of the Middle Belt and northern areas, including Borno, Yobe, Kebbi, Sokoto, Bauchi, Gombe and Plateau states,[532] may cause localized production shortfalls, especially in the northeastern states.[533]

Around 23.3 million people, or more than 18 percent of the population analysed, are projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) across the 16 northern states and the FCT during June–August 2027. This includes 1.5 million people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) located in the northeast and northwest and more than 40 000 people in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in Borno State. These populations account for a significant share of the 33.5 million people (16 percent of the population analysed) projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) nationally across 26 states and the FCT, including all those projected to face Emergency (CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (CH Phase 5).[534]

Nearly 6.4 million children under 5 years of age and almost 786 000 pregnant and breastfeeding women were estimated to face acute malnutrition through September 2026 across northeastern, northwestern and north-central states, including around 2 million children with severe acute malnutrition.[535] Since the beginning of 2026, Nigeria has reported over 65 000 suspected cholera cases across most states, with Borno State remaining the epicentre.[536]



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RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory action

- Disseminate early-warning messages and tailored agricultural and livestock advisories through multiple media channels and provide multipurpose cash assistance to vulnerable and at-risk households to mitigate the impact of forecast dry conditions.
- Distribute diversified livestock feed, grain and fodder and carry out livestock vaccination and deworming ahead of forecast dry conditions.
- Distribute seeds of drought-tolerant and early-maturing crop varieties, including short-cycle millet, maize, cowpea and vegetables, to vulnerable farmers in areas at risk of rainfall deficits and shortened growing periods.
- Establish and rehabilitate small-scale solar-powered irrigation facilities, community watering points and water-harvesting infrastructure to expand dry-season production and improve access to water for crops and livestock.

Emergency response

The Nigeria 2026 HNRP calls for USD 224.4 million for food security and USD 94.4 million for nutrition interventions.[537]

- Provide emergency food and cash assistance to households facing severe acute food insecurity, prioritizing populations facing Emergency (CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (CH Phase 5), displaced people and other highly vulnerable households in conflict-affected areas of northern Nigeria.
- Scale up emergency agricultural assistance to conflict-affected farmers, pastoralists and fishers through agricultural inputs, animal health and livestock support, fisheries assistance and cash, helping households safeguard productive assets and sustain food production despite restricted access and high input costs. When relevant, complement this support with the rapid establishment or rehabilitation of small-scale irrigation schemes, water points, storage facilities and other productive infrastructure.
- Strengthen nutrition interventions for children under 5 years of age and pregnant and breastfeeding women, combining early identification and treatment of acute malnutrition with preventive nutrition services, particularly in displacement-affected and hard-to-reach locations.
- Preposition food, nutrition, agricultural and livestock supplies in strategic areas before seasonal access deteriorates and strengthen flexible last-mile delivery arrangements for inaccessible and newly displaced communities.



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West Africa and the Sahel

Chad

HOTSPOT

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict and displacement, economic pressures, dry conditions

Acute food insecurity is expected to remain a major concern in Chad throughout the outlook period, driven by conflict and displacement, economic pressures and adverse 2026 agropastoral conditions, amid funding gaps and high access constraints.

The Sudan crisis is expected to sustain pressure on food, land, water and markets in eastern Chad.[538] By late August 2026, Chad hosted nearly 943 000 Sudanese refugees and 401 000 returnees.[539] Continued arrivals are likely to exert pressure on food access and livelihoods amid high humanitarian access constraints [540] and funding shortfalls.[541] In August 2026, over 40 percent of surveyed households in Lac, Kanem, Barh El Gazel, Wadi Fira, Ouaddaï and Sila reported lower income and 34 percent cited high food prices as the main shock.[542]

In Lac, persistent insecurity and repeated population displacement are expected to continue disrupting livelihoods during the outlook period. Nearly 295 000 IDPs remain highly exposed, while insecurity restricts access to agricultural land, fishing grounds and pastoral resources.[543, 544] Further displacement and high fuel costs could intensify pressure on limited livelihood opportunities, constrain production and worsen food access.

The 2026 agricultural season has been affected by delayed rainfall, recurrent dry spells and poor vegetation conditions, delaying crop establishment and development and lowering expected yields, particularly in Lac, Batha, Wadi Fira, Ouaddaï and parts of the Sudanian zone. Insecurity, limited fertilizer access and high production costs are likely to further contribute to localized production shortfalls.[545, 546]

Livestock production has been severely constrained by conflict-related movement restrictions and deteriorating pastoral conditions in the Sahelian belt, including Batha and Wadi Fira, and in Kanem, where severe livestock emaciation and unusual animal deaths have been reported. Dwindling pastoral resources could prompt earlier herd movements, straining resources in receiving areas, while further livestock losses and declining production and incomes could erode households' productive assets and deepen acute food insecurity.[547, 548, 549]

From June to August 2026, 3.2 million people (17 percent of the population analysed) were projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), including 241 000 in Emergency (CH Phase 4). Among Sudanese refugees in Chad, 332 000 people faced Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), representing 34 percent of the population analysed, including 82 000 people facing Emergency (CH Phase 4).[550] Around 2 million children under 5 years of age and 219 000 pregnant and breastfeeding women were projected to experience acute malnutrition during October 2025–September 2026, including 484 000 children with severe acute malnutrition.[551] Acute food insecurity is expected to remain elevated, especially in eastern refugee-hosting areas and Lac, where insecurity, displacement and constrained livelihoods persist.[552]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Chad 2026 HNRP calls for USD 155 million for food security and USD 99 million for nutrition interventions.[553]

- Sustain food assistance and cash-based support for refugees, returnees, IDPs and vulnerable host communities in eastern Chad, particularly in Ouaddaï, Wadi Fira, Sila and Ennedi Est, where continued arrivals linked to the Sudan conflict are expected to maintain high humanitarian needs and place additional pressure on food availability, markets and livelihoods.
- Strengthen emergency food assistance coverage in Lac Province, particularly in the departments of Fouli, Kaya and Mamdi, using flexible delivery modalities to respond rapidly to new displacement triggered by insecurity and population movements.
- Expand livelihood protection interventions, including support to crop and livestock production, to help vulnerable households safeguard productive assets and reduce reliance on negative coping strategies in areas affected by conflict, displacement and agropastoral shocks, including Lac Province, eastern refugee-hosting areas and other severely affected pastoral zones.

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

- Intensify the provision of life-saving nutrition services for children under 5 years of age and pregnant and breastfeeding women in eastern Chad, particularly in Ouaddaï, Wadi Fira, Sila and Ennedi Est, where large refugee and returnee populations continue to face heightened food and nutrition risks.
- Scale up emergency pastoral support in areas facing severe forage and water stress, including targeted livestock feed, animal health support, emergency access to water and, where appropriate, strategic destocking, while strengthening monitoring of herd movements and pressure on shared pastoral resources.

Other actions

- Activate targeted early food or cash assistance and acute malnutrition prevention where needs are most severe. Expand safety nets by increasing support to existing recipients and extending coverage to additional households. Strengthen school meals and nutrition services to protect food access, health and learning.



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Mali

HOTSPOT

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, economic shocks, dry conditions

Acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate due to escalating conflict, economic shocks and climate-related constraints affecting agricultural production.

Conflict, which has worsened significantly since April 2026, continues to pose significant risks of violence against civilians, restrictions on movement, forced displacement and destruction of assets.[554, 555, 556] Economic infrastructure and industrial facilities may remain at risk of attacks,[557, 558] while conflict-related disruptions to trade flows, particularly to fuel supplies, are likely to constrain economic activity, raise transport costs and reduce food supplies in local markets.[559] Livelihoods will continue to deteriorate, with significant reductions in livestock production and pastoral incomes expected in central and northern areas.[560, 561] Conflict is also likely to drive further displacement, with 415 000 people already internally displaced as of September 2025.[562, 563, 564, 565]

Cereal prices are expected to remain near or above the five-year average, due to low carryover stocks, high production and transport costs and restricted access to producing areas and markets. Together with low incomes, particularly in conflict-affected areas, these price levels will further erode household purchasing power and limit food access.[566]

Main-season cereal production, with harvests expected in late 2026, is likely to be constrained by reduced planted area resulting from rainfall deficits, conflict-related restrictions on field access and displacement.[567, 568] Year-on-year production declines are estimated at 7 percent for cereals and 20 percent for cotton.[569] Furthermore, the blockade affecting fuel and other supplies entering Bamako severely constrained farmers' access to inputs during critical stages of the cropping season. Limited fertilizer availability and high prices likely reduced application rates, adversely affecting crop yields.[570] Localized production shortfalls are expected in several producing areas due to below-average rainfall that affected crop development.[571, 572, 573]

About 1.6 million people were projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity between June and August 2026, including nearly 57 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4), with the highest severity concentrated in the conflict-affected regions of Ménaka, Gao and Kidal.[574, 575] Humanitarian assistance remains severely constrained by extreme access restrictions and funding shortfalls,[576] increasing the vulnerability of populations in need.[577]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Mali 2026 HNRP calls for USD 149.4 million for food security and USD 47 million for nutrition interventions.[578]

- Enhance and sustain emergency food assistance in conflict-affected northern and central areas, particularly Kidal, Ménaka, Ansongo, the Liptako-Gourma zone and parts of Mopti, Gao and northern Ségou, where conflict continues to constrain market access, livelihoods and food consumption.
- Expand emergency agricultural support for conflict-affected agropastoral households in Kidal, Ménaka, Gao, Mopti, San, Nara and northern Ségou, through the provision of agricultural inputs, animal health support and livelihood recovery packages, to mitigate the effects of restricted access to fields, reduced cultivated areas and disrupted pastoral mobility.
- Strengthen the delivery of life-saving nutrition services in conflict-affected and hard-to-reach areas, particularly Kidal, Ménaka, Gao, Mopti and displacement-affected locations, by expanding community-based management of acute malnutrition and strengthening active screening and referral systems.

Other actions

- Strengthen humanitarian access negotiations and last-mile delivery mechanisms to reach populations affected by access constraints in Kidal, Ménaka, Gao, Tombouctou, Mopti and other hard-to-reach localities, where insecurity, attacks on transport routes and operational restrictions continue to limit assistance delivery.



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Glossary

IPC/CH PHASE 5 EXPLAINED

Catastrophe and Famine both refer to IPC/CH Phase 5, indicating the most extreme food insecurity situations. However, there are key differences: **Catastrophe is a household-level classification, while Famine is an area-level classification.**

Catastrophe

Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is classified at the household level. Households in this phase experience an extreme lack of food and an exhaustion of coping capacities – facing starvation and a significantly increased risk of acute malnutrition and death. Households may be classified in Catastrophe even if the broader area is not classified in Famine. This occurs when less than 20 percent of the population experiences Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) conditions and/or when acute malnutrition and/or mortality levels have not yet reached the thresholds for Famine.

Famine

Famine is an area-level IPC/CH classification. For the IPC, Famine exists in areas where at least one in five households have or are most likely to have an extreme deprivation of food. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition are or will likely be evident. Significant mortality, directly attributable to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease, is occurring or will likely be occurring.

In this phase:

- The prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 years of age reaches or exceeds 30 percent global acute malnutrition by weight-for-height z-score or 15 percent by mid-upper arm circumference measurement, with evidence of rapidly worsening underlying drivers of acute malnutrition.
- Households are destitute.
- Excess mortality is prevalent, with at least two deaths per 10 000 people per day.

Famine with solid evidence
An area is classified as Famine with solid evidence when clear and compelling data on acute food insecurity (food deprivation and livelihood collapse), acute malnutrition and mortality sufficiently support the classification.

Famine with reasonable evidence
An area is classified as Famine with reasonable evidence if two of the three thresholds – acute food insecurity (food deprivation and livelihood collapse), acute malnutrition and mortality – have been reached, and analysts reasonably assess from the broader evidence that the third threshold is likely to have been met.

Acute food insecurity
Acute food insecurity is any manifestation of food deprivation of a severity that threatens lives or livelihoods, regardless of the cause, context or duration. The IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity Scale categorizes acute food insecurity into five phases, from None/Minimal (IPC/CH Phase 1) to Catastrophe/Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). Each phase has distinct implications for where and how interventions should be prioritized.

Cadre Harmonisé
The Cadre Harmonisé (CH) is the multidimensional analytical framework used by the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) to analyse and identify areas and population groups at risk of acute food insecurity in the Sahel, West Africa and Cameroon.

Coping strategies
Activities undertaken by people to secure food, income or other essential goods and services when their normal livelihoods are disrupted or when shocks or hazards affect access to basic needs.

Crisis – IPC/CH Phase 3 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale
In areas classified in Phase 3, households are already unable to meet their minimum food needs and either suffer from those food deficits outright or are forced to make the choice to protect food consumption by engaging in coping strategies that will harm their future ability to access food and sustain their livelihoods. For example, they may sell significant productive assets, forgo essential healthcare or withdraw children from school so that they can eat. As households resort to increasingly severe coping mechanisms, the typically most nutritionally vulnerable (e.g. children and pregnant and breastfeeding women) may start to bear the consequences of food consumption gaps, resulting in high or above-average acute malnutrition levels. At this point, action is needed to ensure immediate relief and support households' ability to sustain themselves and protect families from the dilemma of making choices that will likely lead to worse outcomes in the future.

Emergency – IPC/CH Phase 4 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale
Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is a critical level of acute food insecurity in which households experience large food consumption gaps, often reflected in very high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality, or can only avoid such gaps by resorting to emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. At this phase, households face critical acute food insecurity and urgent action is required to save lives and livelihoods. Without timely intervention, affected populations risk starvation and death.

Food access
Having personal or household financial means to acquire food for an adequate diet, at a level that ensures that the satisfaction of other basic needs is not threatened or compromised, and that adequate food is accessible to everyone, including vulnerable individuals and groups.

Food availability
Having a quantity and quality of food sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, free from adverse substances and acceptable within a given culture, supplied through domestic production or imports.

Food security
A situation in which all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Based on this definition, four food security dimensions can be identified: food availability, economic and physical access to food, food utilization and stability over time.

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a set of tools and protocols aimed at enhancing food security and nutrition analysis to inform decisions and is the result of a partnership of organizations at global, regional and country levels. It is widely accepted by the international community as a global reference for the classification of acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition.

Livelihoods
The capabilities, assets, both material and social, and activities required for a means of living linked to survival and future well-being, including the policies and institutions that shape or constrain access to assets and choices about livelihood activities.

Malnutrition
A physiological condition caused by inadequate, unbalanced or excessive consumption of macronutrients and/or micronutrients. Malnutrition includes undernutrition, micronutrient deficiencies, overweight and obesity, and the resulting diet-related noncommunicable diseases.

Risk of Famine
The IPC partnership defines 'risk of Famine' as the reasonable probability of an area going into Famine (IPC Phase 5) in the projected period, when Famine is not the most likely scenario. When analysts assess that the most likely scenario would result in Famine, either Famine with solid evidence or Famine with reasonable evidence will be classified, depending on the amount and quality of evidence available. By contrast, analysts may assess that in cases where Famine is not the most likely outcome, Famine would occur in an alternative scenario that has a reasonable chance of occurrence. While Famine focuses on the most likely scenario, the 'risk of Famine' focuses on the worst-case scenario that has a reasonable and realistic chance of happening.

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Early warning systems and anticipatory action for preventing Famine

In Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5), populations face an extreme lack of food and are unable to meet their basic needs; starvation and death are widespread. By this stage, lives and livelihoods have already been lost, while social safety nets and community networks have been severely disrupted. Although urgent action can and should prevent further loss of life, these actions will be a late response, as many will have died by this point.[579]

Recent famines have overwhelmingly occurred in contexts of conflict and restrictions on humanitarian access, often compounded by displacement, disrupted livelihoods and markets, and the erosion of essential services and coping capacities.[580, 581] These conditions are often foreseeable, creating opportunities for prevention and early action before Famine thresholds are reached.

People may face Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) – meaning extreme lack of food, exhaustion of coping capacities, starvation and a significantly increased risk of acute malnutrition and death – but the area may not be classified as Famine if widespread deaths and acute malnutrition have not yet occurred in the area.[582, 583]

Risk of Famine indicates a real possibility that an area could fall into Famine in the near future – even if this is not the most likely outcome based on current information, signalling a window for preventive action.[584]

Famine prevention therefore depends on acting on early signals before households exhaust their coping capacities and options for preventing loss of life narrow. This requires timely, multisectoral action to protect food access, livelihoods and essential services, while ensuring safe and sustained humanitarian access.[585, 586, 587]

Figure 8. IPC/CH acute food insecurity phase description and response objectives

PHASE	TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION	PRIORITY RESPONSE OBJECTIVE
1 None/Minimal	Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	Resilience building and disaster risk reduction.
2 Stressed	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	Disaster risk reduction and protection of livelihoods.
3 Crisis	Households either: Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; OR are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.	**URGENT ACTION REQUIRED** to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps.
4 Emergency	Some households either: Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; OR are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.	**URGENT ACTION REQUIRED** to save lives and livelihoods.
5 Catastrophe/ Famine*	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality).	**URGENT ACTION REQUIRED** to revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.

* Some households can be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) even if areas are not classified as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). Given the severity and implications of classifying Famine, specific IPC protocols have been developed, and special considerations are identified in the IPC Technical Manual 3.1 (see pp. 24–25 for more details on criteria: https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc/technical/manual_en). A Famine classification requires evidence on food security, nutrition and mortality at or above IPC/CH Phase 5 thresholds. Depending on the quality and quantity of evidence available, Famine can be classified as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) with solid evidence or as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) with reasonable evidence.

Source: IPC. 2021. *IPC Technical Manual 3.1. Evidence and Standards for Better Food Security and Nutrition Decisions*. Rome. https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc/technical/manual_en

Appendix

Methodology

The identification of hunger hotspots is based on a forward-looking analysis that highlights where acute food insecurity is most likely to worsen significantly over the outlook period. This process is grounded in consensus among food security experts, conflict analysts, economists and climate and natural hazard specialists, including early warning and anticipatory action experts from both FAO and WFP, at headquarters and in the field. Hotspot identification is informed by an initial prioritization using a set of quantitative and qualitative indicators.

Selection process

The selection of hunger hotspots and other situations requiring monitoring follows a two-step approach, combining quantitative analyses with expert qualitative assessments. The analysis focuses specifically on acute food insecurity, rather than less severe forms of food insecurity or malnutrition.

Hunger hotspots are identified based on available evidence indicating that acute food insecurity is likely to worsen during the outlook period, due to key drivers and shocks. Situations requiring monitoring are identified based on evidence of a possible deterioration in acute food insecurity, either where recent acute food insecurity data are available or where shocks indicate a credible risk of deterioration despite the absence of such data.

Step one: quantitative analysis

The quantitative approach covers low- and lower-middle-income countries according to the World Bank classification, including countries and territories covered in the Global Report on Food Crises, and a selected number of displacement-related contexts that are monitored to ensure emerging or potential crises are not overlooked.

The methodology measures and prioritizes the expected deterioration in acute food insecurity across different contexts through a comprehensive indicator framework. It employs eight core indicators organized into two categories: current status indicators, which capture the prevailing severity and scale of acute food insecurity and related conditions, and temporal change indicators, which assess deterioration or improvement in acute food insecurity by comparing the most recent available estimates or projections with those covering a comparable period one year earlier and produced using the same methodology.

The current status indicators comprise:

1. The absolute number of people analysed facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity.
2. The prevalence of people analysed facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), expressed as a percentage of the population analysed.
3. The absolute number of people analysed facing Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity.
4. The prevalence of people analysed facing Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4), expressed as a percentage of the population analysed.

The temporal change indicators comprise:

1. The change in the absolute number of people analysed facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity.
2. The change in the prevalence of people analysed facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), expressed as a percentage of the population analysed.
3. The change in the absolute number of people analysed facing Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity.
4. The change in the prevalence of people analysed facing Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4), expressed as a percentage of the population analysed.

To ensure comparability across diverse contexts, each of the eight core indicators is normalized using a distribution-

based quintile method. This process ranks all countries, territories and situations with available acute food insecurity data according to each indicator's value, subsequently dividing them into five equal groups. Countries, territories and situations are assigned normalized scores from 1 (lowest severity quintile) to 5 (highest severity quintile).

Countries, territories and situations are pre-selected for inclusion in the report as hotspots through a dual-threshold approach.

First, any country, territory or situation receiving a normalized score of 5 on at least one of the four temporal change indicators is automatically pre-selected. This captures those contexts experiencing the sharpest deterioration in any dimension of acute food insecurity. In practical terms, a score of 5 indicates that, for that specific indicator, the country, territory or situation ranks among the worst 20 percent when compared with all other countries, territories or situations for which data on that indicator are available in the database.

Second, countries, territories or situations with populations estimated or projected to experience Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) and/or a risk of Famine are automatically included, regardless of their performance on the temporal change indicators, given the extreme severity of their circumstances.

This methodology is designed to identify contexts where food insecurity crises are emerging or intensifying, by emphasizing both the magnitude and severity of change, thereby highlighting hotspots requiring urgent humanitarian intervention and situations requiring monitoring.

Beyond the eight acute food insecurity-focused indicators, the analysis systematically compiles complementary data on conflict dynamics, economic shocks, natural hazards, displacement and other aggravating factors, including humanitarian access constraints, agricultural seasonality patterns, coping capacity indicators, acute malnutrition rates and population displacement. These additional indicators, while not part of the normalization and ranking process, are compiled into a structured data matrix to inform the subsequent qualitative assessment. Technical experts then evaluate the pre-selected countries, territories and situations to determine the final selection of priority hotspots and other situations requiring monitoring.

Step two: qualitative assessment

The qualitative assessment builds on the results of the quantitative analysis and integrates expert judgement to contextualize data and refine prioritization.

While the quantitative step seeks to compare acute food insecurity estimates or projections for the latest forecast period with those for a comparable period one year earlier, such comparisons are frequently constrained by:

- the absence of comparable analyses in either period, and in some cases the complete absence of data;
- variations in geographical and/or population coverage;
- differences in the reference timeframes; and
- methodological differences across analyses.

As a result, quantitative analysis alone does not always allow for a comprehensive identification of hotspots and situations requiring monitoring. The qualitative component therefore represents a critical step in the selection process, ensuring a nuanced assessment through expert discussion and contextual interpretation.

Regional consultations with technical experts inform the final selection of countries, territories, situations and geographical areas for inclusion in the report. Participants include food security specialists, conflict, climate and economic risk analysts, and emergency preparedness officers with regional expertise. These experts assess both the quantitative rankings and the broader humanitarian and contextual situation to ensure that the selection accurately reflects conditions on the ground. The final selection of hunger hotspots and situations requiring monitoring is based on consensus among FAO and WFP technical experts at headquarters and in the field.

The qualitative process consists of the following:

Regional selection meetings

FAO and WFP analysts convene regional meetings for each of the regions covered by the report. During these meetings, participants discuss the quantitative results and complement them with a qualitative analysis of contextual drivers and risks, focusing on:

- assessing the feasibility of year-on-year comparisons and identifying any methodological, geographical or temporal limitations;

- analysing key drivers likely to affect acute food insecurity in the outlook period, including conflict, economic instability and climate-related risks, based on internal and external sources such as:
    - conflict and political risk: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data conflict events and fatalities, WFP Watch List and Active Early Warnings, which are based on a range of open-source information and internal intelligence;
    - economic risk: WFP Watch List and Active Early Warnings economic risk indicators, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank headline/food inflation rates and gross domestic product growth rates, staple food prices from the FAO Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) Food Price Monitoring and Analysis tool, agricultural production forecasts/estimates from FAO GIEWS Crop Prospects and Food Situation/country briefs;
    - climate risk: WFP Watch List and Active Early Warnings climate indicators, WFP Seasonal Outlook, FAO GIEWS Earth Observation, presence of a lean season, Group on Earth Observations Global Agricultural Monitoring and Anomaly Hotspots of Agricultural Production/Joint Research Centre agricultural condition indicators, and weather forecasts from the International Research Institute for Climate and Society, the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration;
- assessing national coping capacity using the INFORM Risk Index;
- evaluating the severity of humanitarian access constraints through the ACAPS Humanitarian Access Overview index;
- examining nutrition trends, including year-on-year changes in the global acute malnutrition burden and WFP Nutrition Risk Indicator results; and
- analysing refugee trends using data from the UN Refugee Agency.

Each regional meeting concludes with a consensus-based list of countries, territories, situations and geographical areas proposed for inclusion in the report. The rationale for inclusion or exclusion is documented in meeting notes. In addition, countries, territories, situations and geographical areas that were not pre-selected may be discussed to ensure that no potentially deteriorating acute food insecurity situation is overlooked.

Final selection and validation

The regional outcomes are reviewed in a final selection meeting by the report's core team, who compare analyses across regions and with previous editions. In cases of uncertainty or discrepancy, regional analysts and technical experts are consulted to further refine the list. This process ensures technical consensus and strengthens the evidence base of the selection.

The final list of hunger hotspots and situations requiring monitoring is cross-checked against countries identified in the Global Report on Food Crises to ensure coherence and complementarity with GNAFC products. The Global Report on Food Crises list of countries, which comprises countries and territories that required external assistance to cope with shocks affecting food security in the preceding year, defines the primary scope of analysis when assessing the risk of food security deterioration in the Hunger Hotspots report. However, the two reports cover different reference periods. The Hunger Hotspots report provides a six-month forward-looking analysis, covering December–May and June–November, while the Global Report on Food Crises primarily assesses acute food insecurity during the previous calendar year, complemented by available projections for the current year. As a result, countries and territories affected by a new shock or emerging deterioration during the Hunger Hotspots outlook period may still be considered for selection even if they were not included in the latest Global Report on Food Crises.

The number of hotspots or situations requiring monitoring may vary between editions. This reflects differences in acute food insecurity conditions and emerging risks at country, regional and global levels, as captured in the available data and the outcome of the qualitative assessment process.

Categorization of selected countries, territories, situations and geographical areas

Countries, territories, situations and geographical areas selected for inclusion in the report as hunger hotspots are those assessed as facing the highest risk of deterioration in acute food insecurity during the outlook period compared with other contexts globally, and therefore requiring the most urgent attention and action. The analysis focuses specifically on acute food insecurity, rather than less severe forms of food insecurity or malnutrition.

Hotspot countries, territories, situations and geographical areas are further categorized on the basis of three levels of concern:

Hunger hotspots

Hotspots of highest concern

This category includes hotspots facing Famine or a risk of Famine, and populations already in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5). It also covers hotspots at risk of deteriorating towards catastrophic conditions, where people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) are facing worsening conditions, exacerbated by severe access constraints that could lead to an escalation in acute food insecurity and the occurrence of catastrophic conditions in the outlook period.

Hotspots of very high concern

These are hotspots where sizeable populations, more than 500 000 people or over 10 percent of the population analysed (with at least 50 percent of the population analysed), are estimated or projected to be facing Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity, or are classified as severely food insecure according to WFP's CARI methodology; and where the number of people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or severe food insecurity (based on WFP's CARI methodology) is expected to increase during the outlook period, based on the latest data available, and contextual drivers are likely to further deteriorate.

Hotspots

These are hotspots where the number of people facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), or classified as moderately or severely food insecure according to WFP's CARI methodology, is expected to increase during the outlook period, and contextual drivers are likely to further deteriorate; and/or the number of people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity, or identified as severely food insecure under WFP's CARI methodology, is expected to increase during the outlook period, while remaining below 500 000 people or below 10 percent of the population analysed (with at least 50 percent of the population analysed).

Situations requiring monitoring

Several other situations, while not identified as hunger hotspots, are assessed to merit close monitoring. These include:

- Situations where data are insufficient or unavailable to allow for a comparative assessment based on the applied quantitative methodology, but where a qualitative assessment of available evidence on acute food insecurity, acute malnutrition, conflict, displacement, climatic hazards, economic conditions, disease outbreaks and humanitarian access constraints indicates a credible risk of worsening acute food insecurity during the outlook period, as determined by consensus during the regional selection meetings.
- Situations where recent acute food insecurity information is available, and where acute food insecurity is expected to persist or deteriorate during the outlook period. Although the combined assessment of acute food insecurity trends, contextual drivers and projected risks indicates a lower level of concern than in countries, territories and situations selected as hunger hotspots, these situations warrant close monitoring.

No predefined quantitative thresholds are used to distinguish hunger hotspots from situations requiring monitoring. Given differences in data availability, coverage, reference periods and methodologies across contexts, the categorization relies on the combined assessment of acute food insecurity trends, contextual drivers and projected risks. Hunger hotspots represent the situations of greatest concern, requiring the most urgent attention and action, whereas situations requiring monitoring are those where risks warrant close observation during the outlook period.

Risk narrative production

The text describing conditions in hunger hotspots and situations requiring monitoring is prepared by technical experts, including food security specialists and conflict, climate and economic risk analysts. Narratives drafted by one agency are peer-reviewed by counterparts in the other to ensure interagency consensus on the key findings and final wording. Furthermore, the narratives undergo:

- a technical review by the report's core team and selected senior FAO and WFP experts to ensure technical accuracy, consistency and coherence; and
- a review of food security terminology in collaboration with colleagues from the IPC Global Support Unit.

Clearance and validation

The risk narratives and the outcome of the selection process, including the categorization of countries, territories, situations and geographical areas as hunger hotspots or situations requiring monitoring, are further validated through a process of review, clearance and feedback involving:

- FAO and WFP field offices; and
- FAO and WFP management and leadership.

This process helps ensure that the analysis reflects the latest available information, operational realities and contextual

developments, while strengthening the accuracy, relevance and validity of the report's findings.

Further information on the methodology is available upon request.

Acute food insecurity data prioritization and sources
The report prioritizes the use of IPC/CH data to assess populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above). Where recent IPC/CH data are not available, estimates are derived from WFP's CARI methodology, where available. Populations classified as moderately or severely food insecure under WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an approximation of populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above). Additional sources include estimates of people in need of food and livelihoods assistance from HNRPs[588] and data on acute food insecurity from FEWS NET. Data classified as IPC-compatible by FEWS NET are used in the report, in alignment with previous editions of this report and with the approach used in the GRFC. Along these lines, FEWS NET data classified as IPC-aligned – which are evidence-based, but for which some types of evidence required for IPC compatibility were not available to FEWS NET – are not used in the report.

For Myanmar, the acute food insecurity figures for 2027 are based on a pre-analysis conducted under the HNRP, which served as the basis for generating the results for the Myanmar 2027 HNRP.

For Zimbabwe, acute food insecurity figures are based on the projected number of people in need of food assistance in March 2027, as reported in FEWS NET's September 2026 Food Assistance Outlook Brief.

The number of people in need of food security and livelihoods assistance in the West Bank in 2025 is based on the Flash Appeal 2026 and is aligned with the 2026 Global Report on Food Crises.

For all other countries, territories or situations where data are available in this report, acute food insecurity figures are based on IPC/CH analyses.

Data gaps and data that do not meet technical requirements in countries and situations requiring monitoring

Several countries, territories or situations could not be included in this report due to a lack of updated data, because existing data did not meet the technical requirements of the analysis or because there was insufficient evidence on key drivers and contextual trends indicating a credible risk of worsening acute food insecurity.

In the following countries requiring monitoring in this report, acute food insecurity data were not available to allow for a comparative assessment based on the agreed methodology, but available evidence on key drivers and contextual trends indicates a credible risk of worsening acute food insecurity: **Burkina Faso, Cuba, Ethiopia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Lebanon, Niger, Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste.**

In other cases, marked by extremely restricted access to collect data, available information was insufficient to support a comparative assessment and the available evidence on key drivers and contextual trends was also insufficient to establish a credible forward-looking risk of deterioration. In such cases, no assessment for inclusion could be made. This does not preclude the possibility that other countries, territories or situations not included in the report may face high levels of acute food insecurity or deterioration risks that could not be adequately assessed on the basis of the evidence available at the time of analysis.

Refugee situations may exhibit a high prevalence of acute food insecurity due to the protracted and structurally vulnerable nature of displacement crises. However, available food security data are often not projected over the outlook period, may not be sufficiently recent or may not allow for a consistent comparison over time. In addition, forward-looking drivers that would indicate a credible risk of further deterioration during the outlook period may be difficult to establish. As a result, refugee situations may not always meet the evidentiary and methodological requirements for inclusion in the report, despite high prevailing levels of acute food insecurity.

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588 The title of the humanitarian plan varies depending on the context and humanitarian coordination structure in each country. It may be referred to as a Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP), a Humanitarian Response Plan or a Flash Appeal, among others. In addition, the structure and scope of humanitarian clusters differ across countries, leading to a range of food security-related interventions. These may range from food assistance interventions to broader food security programmes that include livelihoods and agricultural support. Regardless of this variation, all such interventions fall within the scope of the Food Security Cluster or Sector.

Global Network Against Food Crises
INTEGRATED ACTIONS FOR LASTING SOLUTIONS

The Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) is a trusted and member-driven platform that strengthens coherence across the humanitarian–development–peace nexus by mobilizing shared analysis, joint knowledge generation and coordinated action among diverse actors. GNAFC convenes operational agencies, donors, research institutions, political bodies and crisis-affected countries to promote alignment of strategies, evidence and priorities in support of a shared vision to address the root causes of food crises and prevent famine. GNAFC works in a complementary manner, coordinating with other food security and nutrition platforms, ensuring coherence while focusing its efforts on where GNAFC has a unique comparative advantage.

This report was jointly prepared by the FAO Global Information and Early Warning System Team, the FAO Office of Emergencies and Resilience, FAO Regional and Country Offices, the WFP Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Service and WFP Regional and Country Offices. It forms part of a series of analytical products that contribute to the generation and sharing of consensus- and evidence-based information for preventing and addressing food crises.

GNAFC members

An Roinn Talmhaíochta, Bia agus Mara
Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine

Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

g7+

IFAD
Investing in rural people

UNHCR
The UN Refugee Agency

unicef

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IBRD • IDA | WORLD BANK GROUP

WFP
World Food Programme

Contact information

Office of Emergencies and Resilience
OER-Director@fao.org
fao.org/emergencies

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Rome, Italy

WFP Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Service
wfpinfo@wfp.org
wfp.org

World Food Programme
Rome, Italy

Connect with us

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